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Just Like Pulling Teeth: 
How Dental Education’s Crisis Shows the Way 
Forward  
for Law Schools 
Eric A. Chiappinelli* 
Nearly all observers of the current law school crisis treat legal 
education as a unique discipline.  In their view, legal education as a whole 
and individual law schools have nothing to learn from outsiders that would 
be useful in reacting to, or thriving in the face of, the radical changes in legal 
education that have resulted from the collapse of the admissions market.  
Further, many critics focus on legal education’s shortcomings and suggest 
internal changes such as expanding programs, reducing faculty, and 
changing the curriculum, that, they believe, will ensure a law school’s 
survival.  Others focus on the closing of Whittier Law School, Indiana Tech 
Law School, Hamline University School of Law, and Charlotte School of 
Law, and the perilous situation of other law schools, such as Arizona Summit 
Law School and Valparaiso University School of Law, suggesting that large-
scale consolidation is inevitable and close at hand. 
I take an entirely different approach.  I believe legal education is not 
sui generis. In fact, another profession faced a similar crisis.  Its schools’ 
admissions market collapsed because of a fundamental change in the 
profession itself.  Many schools expanded their programs, reduced their 
faculty, and changed their curricula.  And yet twelve percent of those schools 
were closed.  That profession was dentistry, and the lessons from its crisis 
are the way forward for legal education and for law schools. 
Law schools should continue to explore new revenue sources if they can 
do so consistently with their core mission of Juris Doctor (JD) education.  
And schools are right to seek to reduce their costs.  Of course, a re-
examination of curricula should be a constant, or at least frequent, focus at 
every law school. 
 
*Frank McDonald Endowed Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law.  My 
thanks to Jennifer Bard, Matthew Bruckner, Paul Caron, Annette Clark, Danshera Cords, Kate 
Foley, Barbara Hahn, Amanda Hale, Ashleigh Hammer, Kat Hand, Catharine Hansard, Evan 
Johnston, and Brian Leiter. 
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But schools should recognize that none of these changes is likely to 
stave off closure.  That is a principal lesson from the crisis in dental 
education.  To become less vulnerable to closure, and, in fact, to thrive, a 
law school needs to take an intentional approach to certain core external 
relationships.  I identify those relationships and offer my observations on 
how schools can build them.  I discuss separately the importance of relative 
prestige among schools and of a national ranking system such as U.S. News.  
During the dental education crisis, dental schools were disadvantaged by a 
lack of both a prestige system and a ranking system. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The causes of the legal education crisis can be traced to the tectonic 
changes in the economics of large law firms (“Big Law”) that, in turn, were 
caused by the 2008 Great Recession.1  The financial crisis and the Great 
Recession resulted in less legal work for Big Law.2  Further, corporate clients 
became increasingly cost-conscious, squeezing Big Law profits by, for 
example, refusing to pay for entry-level lawyers to work on their legal 
matters.3  As a result, Big Law firms cut back their entry-level hiring of 
newly graduated law students beginning with the fall of 2009.4 
This reduction in hiring particularly affected the placement efforts of 
the more elite law schools (perhaps the top 25 or 30 out of roughly 200), 
which tended to place a higher percentage of graduates in Big Law jobs than 
did the non-elite schools.5  Soon though, students at virtually every law 
school found getting a law-related job more difficult.  In essence, as the 
recession spread throughout the economy, the demand for legal work 
contracted throughout the profession, not just in Big Law.  In a cascade effect 
that compounded the difficulty, students at elite law schools who could not 
get Big Law jobs applied for other legal jobs, making it more difficult for 
students at non-elite law schools to get jobs.  By mid-2012, the statistics on 
law graduate placement were clear.  The National Association for Law 
Placement ran headlines that said, “Class of 2011 Law School Grads Face 
Worst Job Market Yet” and “Class Faced Brutal Entry-Level Job Market.”6 
At about the same time as the Great Recession hit hard at Big Law 
entry-level hiring, a number of blogs began sustained criticisms of legal 
 
 1  See Victor Gold, Reducing the Cost of Legal Education: The Profession Hangs 
Together or Hangs Separately, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 497 (2016).   
 2  Jordan Weissmann, The Death Spiral of America’s Big Law Firms, ATLANTIC (Apr. 
19,-2012),-http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/04/the-death-spiral-of-america
s-big-law-firms/256124/.   
 3  Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the 
Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 28 (2011); Ashby 
Jones & Joseph Palazzolo, What’s A First-Year Lawyer Worth?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204774604576631360989675324; Jordan 
Weissmann, Why Law Schools Are So Bad at Creating Lawyers (and How to Fix It), 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/11/why-law-s
chools-are-so-bad-at-creating-lawyers-and-how-to-fix-it/248889/.   
 4  Burk & McGowan, supra note 3, at 31–32, 31 n.80.   
 5  BENJAMIN H. BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL 143 (2015); Richard W. Bourne, The 
Coming Crash in Legal Education: How We Got Here, and Where We Go Now, 45 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 651, 657 (2012); see also William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, 
The Pedigree Problem: Are Law School Ties Choking the Profession?, ABA J. (July 1, 2012), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_pedigree_problem_are_law_school_ties_c
hoking_the_profession.   
 6  NALP, EMPLOYMENT FOR THE CLASS OF 2011—SELECTED FINDINGS (2012), http://ww
w.nalp.org/uploads/Classof2011SelectedFindings.pdf.   
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education.7  These blog posts were frequently anonymously authored and 
featured sweeping indictments of the ethics of those in legal education.  
Many of the repeated arguments were based on the increasing difficulty of 
new law graduates to find what they considered to be suitable employment.8  
The influence of these blogs increased substantially in late 2010 when major 
news media began to report on them.9  The next year, The New York Times 
ran a number of articles criticizing legal education10 and other major media 
news outlets ran similar articles.11 
Doubtless as a result of both the reality of the difficult employment 
market for new lawyers and the sustained critiques of legal education in both 
traditional and new media, law school applications fell.  The number of 
people applying to law school peaked when about 100,000 people applied to 
begin studies in the fall of 2004.12  Over the next six years, the number of 
applicants fell an average of about 2% a year to about 88,000 who applied 
for fall 2010.13 
But then the bottom fell out of law school applications.  The number of 
applicants for fall 2011 declined over 10% from the year before.14  The next 
two cycles were worse, with declines of over 12% each.  In three years, the 
number of law school applicants fell by a third.15  In the five years after the 
job market for new lawyers collapsed, the number of law school applicants 
fell by 38%.16  The number of applicants for fall 2015 was close to the 
number of matriculants five years earlier.17 
 
 7  Daniel D. Barnhizer, Cultural Narratives of the Legal Profession: Law School, 
Scamblogs, Hopelessness, and the Rule of Law, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 663, 664 (2012) 
(dating the rise of such blogs to “at least 2010”).   
 8  Id. at 676–85.   
 9  See BARTON, supra note 5, at 157 n.33.   
 10  David Segal, Behind the Curve: How Law Students Lose the Grant Game, and How 
Their Schools Win, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, at BU1; David Segal, What They Don’t Teach 
Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html; David Segal, Law 
School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/07/ 17/business/law-school-economics-job-market-weakens-tuition-rises.html; David 
Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/01/09/business/09law.html?_r=0.   
 11  See, e.g., Weissmann, supra note 2.   
 12  Archive: ABA End of Year Summary, LSAC, http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/
data/aba-eoy/archive (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).   
 13  Id. (reporting 87,900 people applied to start law school in the fall of 2010, a decline 
of about 13% from 2004).  During those six admissions cycles, the year-on-year change 
ranged from 3.8% to 7.4%. Id.   
 14  Id.   
 15  Id.   
 16  Id.   
 17  Id. (reporting 54,500 applicants for fall 2015); ABA, Enrollment and Degrees 
Awarded 1963-2012 Academic Years, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
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The toll these developments took on law schools and legal education is 
clear.  The number of students matriculating at American law schools 
plummeted.  Just over 52,000 people began legal studies in the fall of 2010.18  
The fall of 2015 saw only 37,000 new law students, a 29% decline in five 
years.19  Total law school enrollment fell by comparable percentages as well, 
of course.20  There were over 33,000 fewer law students in the fall of 2015 
than there were in the fall of 2010.  Those missing law students would have 
filled 46 law schools in 2010.21 
Further, the ability of the entering classes, measured by LSAT score, 
declined as well.  The percentage of matriculants with LSAT scores 
frequently considered high (160 and above) declined by over 22% in five 
years.22  At the same time, the percentage of matriculants with relatively low 
scores (below 150) increased by 68%.23  The students who entered law 
school in 2011, the first year of the decline, graduated and took the bar in 
2014.  In 2014, 2015, and 2016, the results were significantly less happy than 
in prior years.24 
 
administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_a
warded.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (reporting 52,488 matriculants in fall 
2010) [hereinafter ABA Enrollment].   
 18  ABA Enrollment, supra note 17.   
 19  ABA, Change in 1L Matriculants by School—2015 vs 2014, 2015), http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_b
ar/governancedocuments/2015_2014_1l_matriculant_comparison.xlsx.   
 20  Mike Sacks, Law School Enrollment Slumps 5 Percent, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 17, 2015), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202745205074/Law-School-Enrollment-Slumps-5-
Percent?slreturn=20160414161727 (noting 113,900 total JD students in Fall 2015, a decline 
of 23%); ABA Enrollment, supra note 17 (reporting 52,488 matriculants and 147,525 total 
JD students in Fall 2010).   
 21  See ABA Enrollment, supra note 17.  In 2010, there were 200 ABA-approved law 
schools enrolling 147,525 students total, or an average of 738 students each.  The decline in 
students of 33,625 was the equivalent of 46 law schools of average size.   
 22  Jerry Organ, Changes in Composition of the LSAT Profiles of Matriculants and Law 
Schools Between 2010 and 2015, LEGAL WHITEBOARD BLOG (Jan. 18, 2016), http://law
professors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2016/01/in-late-december-2014-i-posted-a-blog-an
alyzing-how-the-distribution-of-matriculants-across-lsat-categories-had-changed-si.html?pla
tform=hootsuite (noting 40.8% of matriculants in fall 2010 to 32% of matriculants in fall 
2015).  The ability of applicants (rather than matriculants), measured by LSAT score also 
declined, and even more precipitously than the decline in matriculants.  The percentage of 
applicants with LSAT scores 160 and above fell 14% while the percentage of applicants with 
LSAT scores below 150 increased a whopping 146% between fall 2010 and fall 2017.  Paul 
Caron, Proportion of Law School Applicants by LSAT Bands, TAXPROF BLOG (June 12, 
2017),-http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2017/06/proportion-of-law-school-
applicants-with-lsats-160-are-down-35-since-2010.html.   
 23  Organ, supra note 22 (comparing 14.2% of matriculants in fall 2010 to 23.8% in fall 
2015).   
 24  See, e.g., ACCESSLEX INST., LEGAL EDUCATION DATA DECK: KEY TRENDS ON ACCESS, 
AFFORDABILITY AND VALUE 9, 21 (2017); Derek T. Muller, Visualizing the Overall Bar Pass 
Rate Declines in 2015 Across Jurisdictions, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY (Dec. 7, 2015), 
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The decline in the number and quality of law school applicants has 
taken a financial toll on law schools, as well.  Both Moody’s and Standard 
& Poor’s recognize that legal education as an industry has become 
increasingly perilous financially since the Big Law implosion because of the 
deterioration in admissions.25  The effects are most salient at the so-called 
stand-alone law schools, those that are unaffiliated with a college or 
university.26  Vermont Law School, for example, a stand-alone school, saw 
its debt downgraded in 2014 by Moody’s, even though it experienced only a 
10% drop in tuition revenue.27  The federal Department of Education put 
three law schools on its “heightened cash monitoring list,” each of which has 
had well-publicized financial problems.28 
 
http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2015/12/visualizing-the-overall-bar-pass-rate-declines-
in-2015-across-jurisdictions; Staci Zaretsky, The Great Law School Brain Drain Is Why More 
People Are Failing The Bar Exam Than Ever Before, ABOVE THE LAW (Jan. 20, 2016), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2016/01/the-great-law-school-brain-drain-is-the-reason-why-more-
people-are-failing-the-bar-exam-than-ever-before/?rf=1.   
 25  Standard & Poor’s, As Law School Demand Drops, Credit Quality Among U.S. 
Schools Diverges, RATINGSDIRECT (Dec. 5, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/ public/resources/
documents/lawschoolcredit.pdf; MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, LAW SCHOOLS CHALLENGED 
TO ADAPT TO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE LEGAL INDUSTRY (May 5, 2014).   
 26  See ABA, ABA-approved law schools, https://www.americanbar.org/ groups/
legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) 
(listing ABA-approved law schools) [hereinafter ABA-approved law schools].  There are 202 
fully approved (not provisional) law schools that offer a JD (the JAG school only offers 
advanced law degrees).  The following schools are stand-alone and non-profit: Albany Law 
School, Appalachian School of Law, Ave Maria School of Law, Brooklyn Law School, 
California Western School of Law, John Marshall Law School (Chicago), Michigan State 
University School of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, New England Law, New York 
Law School, South Texas College of Law Houston, Southwestern Law School, Thomas 
Jefferson School of Law, Vermont Law School, and Thomas M. Cooley Law School. The 
following schools are for-profit: Arizona Summit Law School and Florida Coastal School of 
Law (both InfiLaw-owned schools; note the third InfiLaw school, Charlotte School of Law, 
just closed), Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School, and Charleston School of Law.  In addition, 
Western State College of Law is for-profit but not stand-alone.  Thus, there are 19 stand-alone 
(i.e., unaffiliated with a university) law schools of which 4 are for-profit. In addition, 1 law 
school is owned by a for-profit university.  
 27  See Vermont Law School, IRS Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt From 
Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2013), http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/ 
2014/237/251/2014-237251952-0bbd9645-9.pdf.  See also Press Release, Moody’s Investors 
Service, Moody’s Downgrades Vermont Law School to Ba1; outlook negative (Apr. 14, 
2014), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Vermont-Law-School-to-Ba
1-outlook-negative—PR_297223; Karen Sloan, New Vermont Law School dean taking on 
$3.3m budget shortfall, NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/ 
id=1202579363738/New-Vermont-Law-School-dean-taking-on-33M-budget-shortfall-.  
 28  See Karen Sloan, Three Law Schools Face Government Scrutiny Over Finances, 
NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202746287517/Three-
Law-Schools-Face-Government-Scrutiny-over-Finances; see also, Diane Knich, Charleston 
School of Law Founders Withdrew $25 Million in Profits Leaving School on Shaky Financial 
Ground, POST & COURIER (Charleston), (May 25, 2014), http://www.postandcourier.com/ 
article/20140525/PC16/140529595 [http://archive.is/xhk5x]; Gary Warth, Jefferson Law 
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A great many law schools connected with universities clearly face 
similar problems but are able to conceal those problems from the public 
because the central university quietly covers the law school’s revenue 
shortfall.29  A particularly vivid and public example is the University of 
Minnesota.  The law school has seen its student body fall by one-third since 
2010, and despite internal cost-cutting measures, is being supported by an 
average of $3 million per year in transfers from the central university.30 
Other sophisticated participants in the legal education area also 
recognized that the fundamental economics of legal education were 
changing.  In early 2012, Thomson Reuters, the multinational publishing 
conglomerate that owned West Publishing Company for over 15 years, put 
the casebook and law student study aid assets on the market.31  Presumably, 
part of Thomson Reuters’s calculus was that the decline in law students 
meant a decline in casebook and study aid sales that seemed likely to be more 
than a temporary dip.32  A year later those assets were purchased by a private 
equity firm that specializes in “niche-market leaders at the lower end of the 
 
School Lays Off 12 Workers to Save $4.4M, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 16, 2013); Staci 
Zaretsky, Much Maligned Law School Cuts First-Year Class, Announces Layoffs, ABOVE THE 
LAW (July 2, 2014), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/07/breaking-much-maligned-law-school-
cuts-entire-first-year-class-announces-layoffs/.   
 29  See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sustaining the Canary in Toxic Times: Parables About 
Survival for Legal Education, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 532 (2016); David Yellen, Post-
Crisis Legal Education: Some Premature Thoughts, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 523, 528 (2016); 
Gold, supra note 1; Richard A. Matasar, The Canary in the Coal Mine: What the University 
Can Learn from Legal Education, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 161, 168 (2013); David Barnhizer, 
Looking at the Law School ‘Crisis’ from the Perspective of the University, LAWNEXT (Nov. 
6, 2014), http://lawnext.org/looking-at-the-law-school-crisis-from-the-perspective-of-the-
university/; Standard & Poor’s, supra note 25, at 9; Frank H. Wu, For Legal Education, 
Adaption is the Only Option for a Better Future, NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 16, 2017), http://www.nation
allawjournal.com/id=1202776867145/For-Legal-Education-Adaption-is-the-Only-Option-fo
r-a-Better-Future?slreturn=20170217143550&LikelyCookieIssue=true.   
 30  Mila Koumpilova, University of Minnesota law dean says enrollment, budget troubles 
should be ending, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/u-law-dean-says-
worst-may-be-over/368490551/; Josh Verges, UMN law school losses expected to total $16M 
by 2018, TWINCITIESPIONEERPRESS.COM, (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.twincities.com/2016/ 
02/11/umn-law-school-losses-expected-to-total-16m-by-2018/.   
 31  Letter from Chris Parton, General Manager, Thompson Reuters Law School 
Publishing, to author (2012) (on file with author); Even West is Shedding West: Sounds like 
TR Legal’s law school publishing business “may” end up being for sale, PRO-SEBLOG.COM 
(Jan. 20, 2012), http://pro-seblog.com/2012/01/20/even-west-is-shedding-west-sounds-like-
tr-legals-law-school-publishing-business-may-end-up-being-for-sale-2/; see also About Us: 
Company History, THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/en/about-us/company-
history.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (Thomson Reuters acquired West Publishing in the 
1990s).   
 32  Eric Chiappinelli, Possible West/Foundation sale, fewer law students next fall, and 
why law education should look to dental education, FAC. LOUNGE (Jan. 23, 2012, 1:26PM), 
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2012/01/possible-westfoundation-sale-fewer-law-students-
next-fall-and-why-law-education-should-look-to-denta.html.   
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middle market.”33 
Law schools have reconfigured in the wake of changes in the demand 
for legal education.  Thomas M. Cooley Law School, accredited as one law 
school with five campuses, closed one of its campuses because of the 
economic consequences of declining enrollment.34  In the most clear-cut 
instances of structural change, Indiana Tech closed its law school, and 
InfiLaw, a private-equity portfolio company, closed Charlotte School of 
Law, one of its three for-profit law schools.35  Hamline University closed its 
law school in substance, as well.36  Ostensibly, Hamline combined its law 
school with William Mitchell College of Law, a stand-alone school.  In fact, 
William Mitchell controlled the “combined” school.  The school changed its 
name to Mitchell Hamline School of Law and retained some of Hamline’s 
faculty.  In all other respects, Hamline University School of Law 
disappeared.37  Several other law schools have changed their operating 
structure since the advent of the law school crisis, although how those 
changes, which include combining and splitting of campuses, are related to 
the crisis is more opaque.38 
 
 33  Eureka Growth Capital, About Eureka Growth Capital, 
http://www.eurekagrowth.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2017); Paul Caron, Thomson Reuters 
Sells Foundation Press, West to Eureka Growth Capital, TAXPROF BLOG (Feb. 4. 2013), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2013/02/thomson-reuters.html; Jennifer Smith, 
Thomson Reuters Bids Adieu To Law School Publishing, WALL ST. J.  (Feb 4, 2013), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2013/02/04/thomson-reuters-bids-adieu-to-law-school-
publishing/.   
 34  Belinda Thurston, Cooley ‘Right-Sizing’, CITY PULSE, Aug. 15, 2014, 
http://lansingcitypulse.com/article-10487-cooley-’right-sizing’.html; Staci Zaretsky, 
Troubled Law School To ‘Cease Operations’ At One Of Its Campuses, ABOVE THE LAW (Oct. 
3, 2014), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/10/troubled-law-school-to-cease-operations-at-one-
of-its-campuses/.   
 35  Staci Zaretzsky, Indiana Tech Law School To Close, Citing $20 Million Losses, 
ABOVE THE LAW (Oct. 31, 2016), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/10/indiana-tech-law-school-
to-close-citing-20-million-in-losses/. Ashby Jones, Private-Equity Group’s for-Profit Law 
School Plan Draws Critics, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/privateequity-group8217s-forprofit-law-school-plan-draws-critics-1382312687 (on 
InfiLaw’s ownership by private equity firm); Press Release, Charlotte School of Law, 
Charlotte School of Law Statement regarding Closure (Aug. 24, 2017), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/files/Press%20Release_Closure.p
df.   
 36  Zaretzsky, supra note 35.  
 37  Maura Lerner, Hamline, William Mitchell law schools to merge, STAR TRIB., Feb. 13, 
2015,-http://www.startribune.com/hamline-william-mitchell-law-schools-to-merge/2918568
91/; see also Complaint at 4–5, ¶ 20, Moy v. William Mitchell Coll. of Law, No. 62-CV-15-
2009 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2015) (recombining faculty); Answer at 5, ¶ 20, Moy v. William 
Mitchell College of Law, No. 62-CV-15-2009 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 8, 2015) (not denying 
complaint’s allegation regarding combining faculty); Paul Campos, Is Hamline Law School 
on its last legs?, LAWYERS, GUNS & MONEY BLOG (July 16, 2013), http://www.
lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2013/07/is-hamline-law-school-on-its-last-legs.   
 38  Rutgers combined its two law schools into one, although each retained its own campus, 
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The law schools also responded with intentional changes in their 
operations as well as to their structure.  Law schools admitted a higher 
percentage of their applicants, even though those applicants’ LSAT scores 
declined.39  Schools accepted 67% of their applicants for fall 2009 but 78% 
for fall 2014.40  Law schools also increased their financial aid awards, which 
simply means they agreed to discount their tuition in order to attract 
students.41  The decrease in net tuition per student, coupled with the decline 
 
administration, and faculty. Letter from the Faculty of Rutgers School of Law to the Univ. of 
Med. and Dentistry of N.J. Advisory Comm. (Jan. 31, 2012); Leslie Brody & Patricia Alex, 
Fewer Applying to Rutgers Law School, RECORD, June 10, 2012, at A1; Nic Corbett, Rowan 
merger plan complicates proposal to merge 2 Rutgers law schools, NJ.COM (Feb. 8, 2012), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/02/proposal_to_merge_2_rutgers_la.html; David 
Gialanella, Rutgers Law Merger Gets Final Sign-off, N.J.L.J., Aug. 3, 2015, 
http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=1202733738448/Rutgers-Law-Merger-Gets-Final-Signoff; 
Zack Needles, Rutgers Approves Law School Merger, N.J.L.J., Apr. 2, 2015, 
http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=1202722479407/Rutgers-Approves-Law-School-Merger?s
lreturn=20160712104215. See also Jonathan Lai, Rutgers puzzles law enrollment in Camden: 
Why did twice as many students choose Newark?, PHILLY.COM, Nov. 7, 2016, 
http://www.philly.com/philly/education/20161106_Rutgers_puzzles_law_enrollment_in_Ca
mden__Why_did_twice_as_many_students_chose_Newark_.html. Widener University had 
one accredited law school with two campuses and faculties, but one dean. Widener split them 
into two separately accredited law schools with a different dean running each one, but both 
law schools remained under Widener University’s control. Jeff Mordock, Widener Law Asks 
Marketing Firm to Assess Possible Name Change, DEL. L. WKLY., Oct. 1, 2014, 
http://www.delawarelawweekly.com/id=1202671820366/Widener-Law-Asks-Marketing-Fir
m-to-Assess-Possible-Name-Change?slreturn=20160712104649. Penn State also had one 
accredited law school with two campuses and faculties, but one dean. It apparently intended 
to close one campus but then changed course and essentially spun off that campus to become 
a separately accredited law school under the aegis of Penn State but with nearly no emphasis 
on the Penn State name. Charles Thompson, Dickinson School of Law wins American Bar 
accreditation for campuses in Carlisle and State College, PENN LIVE BLOG (June 18, 2014), 
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2014/06/dickinson_school_of_law_wins_a.htm
l; Charles Thompson, Penn State’s Dickinson School of Law’s proposed plan to end 1st-year 
classes touches off debate, PENN LIVE BLOG (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.pennl
ive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2012/09/penn_states_dickinson_school_o.html.   
 39  See Craig M. Boise & Andrew P. Morriss, Boise & Morriss: The Shameful Truth Is 
That Many Law Schools Have Admitted Students With Low LSAT Scores To Prop Up Tuition 
Revenue And Now Seek To Avoid Accountability For The Ensuing Poor Bar Passage Results, 
TAXPROF BLOG (Dec. 19, 2016), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2016/12/boise-
morrissthe-shameful-truth-is-that-many-law-schools-have-admitted-students-with-low-lsat-
scores.html.   
 40  Law School Admission Council, Historic ABA End of Year Summary: Applicants, 
Admitted Applicants & Applications, https://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/aba-eoy/archi
ve (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (58,400 acceptances of 86,600 applicants for Fall 2009; 43,500 
acceptances from 55,700 applicants for Fall 2014).   
 41  Dan Rodriguez, The exodus of high-band LSAT students, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 23, 
2017), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/06/the-exodus-of-high-band-lsat-
students.html; Derek T. Muller, The percentage of law school enrollees receiving 
scholarships continues to climb, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY BLOG (Mar. 27, 2017), 
http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2017/3/the-percentage-of-law-school-enrollees-receivin
g-scholarships-continues-to-climb; Gold, supra note 1, at 504 n.19; Matt Leichter, Which Law 
CHIAPPINELLI (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2017  11:14 AM 
10 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1 
in matriculants, of course resulted in decreased total tuition revenues for 
schools.42 
Law schools also reduced their full-time (whether tenure-track or long-
term contract) faculty.  Full-time faculty compensation is a typical law 
school’s largest expense and given the many tenured faculty, it is difficult to 
reduce.43  Full-time law faculty generally earn $120,000 to $175,000, 
although higher salaries for star academics, faculty at wealthy schools, or 
faculty at schools in cities with high costs of living might be much higher.44  
Benefits are typically one-third of base salary so the cost to a school for a 
full-time law faculty member is roughly between $160,000 and $235,000.45  
As early as 2013, it was reported that schools were reducing their faculties 
in response to the decline in enrollment.46  Full-time faculty at American law 
schools declined 16% from the fall of 2010 to the fall of 2016.  That 
 
Schools Are Shedding Full-Time Faculty? (2016 Edition), LAST GEN X AM. BLOG (Jan. 17, 
2017), https://lawschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.com/2017/01/17/which-law-schools-are-
shedding-full-time-faculty-2016-edition/; Chelsea Phipps, More Law Schools Haggle on 
Scholarships, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10000872396390444130304577557182667927226; Karen Sloan, It’s a buyers’ market at 
law school, NAT’L L.J., June 25, 2012, http://www.nationallawjournal.com/ 
id=1202560485444/Its-a-buyers-market-at-law-school-?slreturn=20160712105426.   
 42  See Brown, supra note 29; Yellen, supra note 29; Gold, supra note 1; Matasar, supra 
note 29; Wu, supra note 29; Barnhizer, supra note 29; Leichter, supra note 41; As Law School 
Demand Drops, Credit Quality Among U.S. Schools Diverges, supra note 25, at 1, 9; Paul 
Campos, 80% to 85% of ABA law schools are currently losing money, LAWYERS, GUNS & 
MONEY BLOG (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2013/11/80-to-85-
of-aba-law-schools-are-currently-losing-money.  
 43  David Frakt, Cost Cutting in an Age of Declining Law School Enrollment, FACULTY 
LOUNGE (Jan 15, 2015, 10:35 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/01/cost-cutting-
in-an-age-of-declining-law-school-enrollment.html; University Budgets: Where Your Fees 
Go, TOPUNIVERSITIES (July 25, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.topuniversities.com/student-
info/student-finance/university-budgets-where-your-fees-go. See also Donna M. Desrochers 
& Rita Kirshstein, Labor Intensive or Labor Expensive? Changing Staffing and 
Compensation Patterns in Higher Education, at 15, DELTA COST PROJECT AT AM. INSTS. FOR 
RESEARCH (Feb. 2014), http://www.deltacostproject.org/sites/default/files/products/ Delta
CostAIR_Staffing_Brief_2_3_14.pdf (providing a breakdown of faculty expenditures at 
universities).   
 44  See Paul L. Caron, 2014-15 SALT Survey Of Law Professor Salaries, TAXPROFBLOG 
(June 17, 2015), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2015/06/2014-15-salt-survey-of-
law-professor-salaries.html (listing reported salaries at 11 highly ranked law schools across 
the U.S. The median salary for assistant professors was $121,800; for pre-tenured associate 
professors, it was $131,028, and for tenured professors, it was $175,002. The average of those 
medians is $142,610.).   
 45  See Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Appendix 1, (2017), https://www.aaup.org/
file/ARES17_corrections_0.pdf (showing that benefits as a percent of salary vary but 30%-
35% is typical.).  My impression is that law faculty are better paid than other faculty and so 
their benefits are higher too.   
 46  Ashby Jones & Jennifer Smith, Amid Falling Enrollment, Law Schools Are Cutting 
Faculty, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ SB1000142412788
7323664204578607810292433272.   
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represents over 1,400 fewer full-time faculty over the course of six years.47 
While that number is relatively salient, the methods used to reduce 
faculty are generally opaque, as schools may be reluctant to announce that 
they are actively seeking to shrink their faculty.48  Perhaps the most 
institutionally painless way to reduce faculty is simply to decide not to 
replace faculty who die, retire, or take jobs elsewhere.  Annual hiring of 
entry-level faculty has fallen by about 60% since 2011, both in the number 
of people hired and in the number of schools that are hiring, with fewer than 
one-third of law schools doing any entry-level faculty hiring in recent 
years.49 
Many law schools publicly announced buyout offers to considerable 
numbers of their law faculty, and surely many other law schools made such 
offers without publicity.50  In fact, in a few instances, the offers were made 
to the entire tenured faculty.51  Other schools, though usually more 
discreetly, threatened draconian increases in work load unless a sufficient 
number of faculty left and, in one case, the school gave notice that the entire 
untenured law school faculty could be terminated.52 
Many law schools have also attempted to increase their revenue from 
ancillary sources. That is, revenue from sources other than JD tuition.  Most 
particularly, schools initiated or expanded the size of their LLM programs, 
frequently marketing these programs to international students who already 
possessed law degrees in their home countries.53 
 
 
 
 47  Leichter, supra note 41.   
 48  Id.   
 49  Sarah Lawsky, Spring Self-Reported Entry Level Hiring Report 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(June 1, 2017), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/entry-level-hiring-report/ 
(reporting 99 schools hiring 155 entry level professors for fall 2011 and 42 schools hiring 62 
entry level professors for fall 2017).   
 50  Paul Caron, List Of Law School Faculty Buyouts, TAXPROF BLOG (Nov. 30, 2015), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2015/11/list-of-law-school-faculty-buyouts.html 
(linking to details about individual schools).   
 51  See, e.g., Mitch Ryals, Why Gonzaga University School of Law offered buy-outs to its 
tenured professors, BLOGLANDER (Nov. 21, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://www.inlander.com/ 
Bloglander/archives/2015/11/21/why-gonzaga-university-school-of-law-offered-buy-outs-
to-its-tenured-professors.   
 52  Paul Caron, New England Law Faculty Face 8-Course Teaching Loads, Mandatory 
Office Presence (M-F, 9-5) Unless 35% Accept Buyouts, TAXPROF BLOG (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2013/10/new-england-.html; David Lat, A Law 
School’s Possible Purse of Its Junior Faculty Ranks, ABOVE LAW (July 1, 2013, 4:05 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/07/a-law-schools-possible-purge-of-its-junior-faculty-ranks/.   
 53  See HANOVER RESEARCH, ALTERNATIVE REVENUE GENERATION PRACTICES FOR LAW 
SCHOOLS (2013), http://www.hanoverresearch.com/media/Alternative-Revenue-Generation-
Practices-for-Law-Schools.pdf.   
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Tellingly, turnover among law school deans has greatly increased.  
Over one-third of all deans left their position between 2012 and 2014, a rate 
one knowledgeable observer terms “unprecedented.”54  In 2014, more than 
one in five of the nation’s law schools had a new dean.55  In addition to being 
strong evidence that the difficulty of managing a law school has increased 
greatly, high dean turnover means that law schools expend financial and 
psychic resources in identifying a new dean and transitioning from the old to 
the new.  It also means that many schools are unable to formulate rational, 
consistent responses to the legal education crisis because of both the change 
in leadership and the lag time necessary for a new (usually inexperienced) 
dean to get up to speed.56 
Many observers, often law school deans, proposed many programmatic 
and operational changes that law schools should adopt, either to help end the 
crisis in legal education or to take advantage of the radical change in the 
landscape, but as might be expected, absolutely no consensus emerged about 
what legal education as a whole, or law schools individually, should do.57  
One of the more frequent suggestions, however, was some form of curricular 
and structural change that would permit law schools to train graduates who 
would be “practice ready.”  Perhaps the most thoughtful and elaborated 
description of this suggestion was by Bill Henderson.58  While frequently 
suggested, a focus on practice-ready graduates was also frequently, and 
thoughtfully, attacked as either impractical or misguided.59  A second theme 
for reform was to modify or eliminate tenure as a way to make law schools 
more nimble in responding to changes in legal education.60  Yet another 
common theme was that law schools should embrace online teaching and 
 
 54  David Barnhizer, “Deaning” in the “New Normal,” LAWNEXT (July 2, 2015), 
http://lawnext.org/deaning-in-the-new-normal/ [http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/ 
search?q=cache:oBqvYmb4IYJ:lawnext.org/author/dbarnhizer/page/2/&num=1&hl=en&gl
=us&strip=1&vwsrc=0].   
 55  Jack Crittenden, A Record Year for New Deans, NAT’L JURIST, Mar. 2015, at 5.   
 56  Barnhizer, supra note 54.   
 57  See, e.g., Rick Bales, Law School Innovations, L. DEANS LEGAL EDUC. BLOG (Oct. 16, 
2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/law_deans/2016/10/law-school-innovations.html; 
Libby A. Nelson, Crisis or Opportunity? INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Jan. 6, 2012), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/01/06/law-school-leaders-discuss-issues-past-
year-annual-meeting; Rachel M. Zahorsky, Law Deans and a Law Professor Respond to the 
‘Law School Bubble’, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 22, 2012, 4:10 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
lawscribbler/article/podcast_episode_01.  
 58  William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461 (2013); see also 
Robert J. Condlin, “Practice Ready Graduates:” A Millennialist Fantasy, 31 TOURO L. REV. 
75, 75 n.2 (2014) (referencing sources).   
 59  E.g., Condlin, supra note 58; Nora V. Demleitner, Circular Limitations, Cost 
Pressures, and Stratification in Legal Education: Are Bold Reforms in Short Supply?, 44 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1014 (2014).   
 60  E.g., Jason Mazzone, Tenure and the Law School, BALKINIZATION (May 15, 2012), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/05/tenure-and-law-school.html.   
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learning and should structure their courses as competency modules rather 
than as traditional doctrine-based courses.61 
Throughout the crisis, there has been a tacit assumption of legal 
education’s exceptionalism.  We have presumed that legal education is in no 
way like other disciplines or like higher education generally.  To the extent 
that observers have suggested that legal education look to another discipline, 
it has almost always been medical education.62  And nearly always they point 
to medical education as a paradisiacal paradigm.63  Jennifer Bard has 
published perhaps the most cogent recent takedown of this view.64 
But legal education is not a special snowflake.  Law schools recruit 
entering classes, educate students, and help them get their first professional 
jobs.  Law schools have external constituencies such as accreditors, licensure 
bodies, potential students, and alumni/ae.  Ninety percent of law schools are 
in universities just like other professional schools.65  Within those 
 
 61  See MICHELE R. PISTONE & MICHAEL B. HORN, DISRUPTING LAW SCHOOL: HOW 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION WILL REVOLUTIONIZE THE LEGAL WORLD (2016), 
https://www.christenseninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Disrupting-law-
school.pdf; Karen Sloan, AALS Hears Words of Caution from Departing Dean, NAT’L L.J. 
(Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202537486631/AALS-hears-words-
of-caution-from-departing-dean-.   
 62  R. Michael Cassidy, Beyond Practical Skills: Nine Steps for Improving Legal 
Education Now, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1515, 1517 n.10 (2012).  But cf. Deborah Maranville et al., 
Lessons for Legal Education from the Engineering Profession’s Experience with Outcomes-
Based Accreditation, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1017 (2012) (suggesting legal education 
should look to accreditation standards used in engineering schools); Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, The Economics of Law School, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 24, 2012, 3:01 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/24/the-economics-of-law-school/ (implying that legal 
education and veterinary education are comparable, at least in their economic situations).   
 63  E.g., Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law School Disappoints Law Students, 
the Public, and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W.L. REV. 219 (2007); Neil Hamilton, 
Professional-Identity/Professional-Formation/Professionalism Learning Outcomes: What 
Can We Learn About Assessment From Medical Education?, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
(forthcoming 2017) , https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2962461; Neil 
Hamilton & Sarah Schaefer, What Legal Education Can Learn from Medical Education About 
Competency-Based Learning Outcomes Including Those Related to Professional Formation 
and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 399 (2016); Brent E. Newton, The Ninety-Five 
Theses: Systematic Reforms of American Legal Education and Licensure, 64 S.C. L. REV. 55 
(2012); Ethan Bronner, To Place Graduates, Law Schools are Opening Firms, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/education/law-schools-look-to-
medical-education-model.html.   
 64  Jennifer F. Bard, “Practicing Medicine and Studying Law”: How Medical Schools 
Used to Have the Same Problems We Do and What We Can Learn from Their Efforts to Solve 
Them, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 135 (2011); see also, Kevin Kiley, Med Schools Are a Target 
for Universities Seeking Prestige and New Revenues, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 20, 2012), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/09/20/med-schools-are-target-universities-
seeking-prestige-and-new-revenues.   
 65  See generally Association of American Medical Colleges, AAMC Medical School 
Members, (2017), https://members.aamc.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?webcode= 
AAMCOrgSearchResult&orgtype=Medical%20School (listing all medical school members 
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universities, law school deans deal with provosts, CFOs, presidents, and 
boards.  And law schools co-exist with other academic units such as 
undergraduate colleges, graduate schools, and professional schools.  The 
insularity of law school crisis observers is striking in light of these salient 
similarities between law schools and other higher education entities. 
In fact, the professional education of another discipline went through a 
crisis very similar to the legal crisis.66  The trigger was a radical, permanent 
change in the profession.  That change then caused a rapid contraction in the 
applicant pool accompanied by a decline in applicant credentials.  Twelve 
percent of the schools were shuttered—the equivalent of twenty-four law 
schools closing their doors—including several extremely prestigious 
universities.  That profession was dentistry, and the crisis took place in the 
1980s and ‘90s.  I describe that crisis in Parts II and III. 
Most observers have, some would say in typical lawyer fashion, 
focused on the negative aspects of the legal education crisis.  They have 
pointed fingers at the various actors as causes, amplifiers, or Neros of the 
crisis.  They frequently have a fatalistic tone about both the crisis and the 
future of legal education.  Several have focused on the possibility of many 
law schools closing.67 
 
of the Association of American Medical Colleges); Commission on Dental Accreditation, 
Predoctoral (DDS/DMD) Dental Education Programs, (2017), http://www.ada.org/en/coda/ 
find-a-program/search-dental-programs#t=us&sort=%40codastatecitysort%20ascending 
&f:programs=[Predoctoral%20(DDS%2FDMD)%20Dental%20Education%20Programs] 
(listing all CODA-accredited dental schools); Am. Veterinary Med. Found., Accredited 
Colleges Of Veterinary Medicine, https://www.avma.org/ProfessionalDevelopment/ 
Education/Accreditation/Colleges/Documents/colleges_accredited.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 
2017) (listing all accredited veterinary schools); Nat’l Architectural Accrediting Bd., 
Architecture Programs: Search Results, (2017), http://www.naab.org/school-search-
results/?f1_6472=&f1_6476=1 (listing all accredited architecture schools).   
 66  I first noted in 2012 the similarity between the legal education crisis and the dental 
education crisis.  See Chiappinelli, supra note 32.  Brian Leiter and Richard Gershon also 
commented on the vulnerability of some law schools and the possible parallels to dental 
schools.  I. Richard Gershon, A Lesson from a Different Profession, L. DEANS ON LEGAL 
EDUC. BLOG (Nov. 18, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/law_deans/2013/11/a-lesson-
from-a-different-profession.html; Brian Leiter, The Dental School Analogy, BRIAN LEITER’S 
L. SCH. REPS. (Nov. 18, 2013), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/11/the-dental-
school-analogy.html.  See also Jerry Organ, What Law Schools Can Learn from Dental 
Schools in the 1980s Regarding the Consequences of a Decline in Applicants, LEGAL 
WHITEBOARD (Oct. 20, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/ 
2014/10/what-law-schools-can-learn-from-dental-schools-in-the-1980s-regarding-the-
consequences-of-a-decline-.html.   
 67  E.g., Burk & McGowan, supra note 3; David Barnhizer, Law Schools, Law Jobs and 
the “Second Wave” of Applicant Decline, LAWNEXT (June 22, 2015), http://lawnext.org/law-
schools-law-jobs-and-the-second-wave-of-applicant-decline/; David Barnhizer, Looking at 
the Law School ‘Crisis’ from the Perspective of the University, LAWNEXT (Nov. 6, 2014), 
http://lawnext.org/looking-at-the-law-school-crisis-from-the-perspective-of-the-university/; 
Brian Leiter, Predictions About Closings of ABA-Accredited Law Schools Over the Next 
Decade, BRIAN LEITER’S L. SCH. REPS. (Oct. 3, 2012), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/ 
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But my focus here is very different.  In Part IV, I identify and describe 
the lessons law schools and legal education can learn from the crisis in dental 
education to avoid closure and, in fact, to thrive.  The lessons of dental 
education are the way forward for legal education as a whole and even more 
so for law schools that want to gain an edge over other law schools.  The way 
forward is understanding that internal changes to legal education, important 
as they may be on their own, are not likely to ensure a law school’s survival.  
Rather, schools must explicitly focus on their missions and must engage with 
critical external constituencies, within the university as well as beyond it.  
The drivers of those efforts are the law school deans and faculties. 
II. THE STORY OF CHANGES IN THE PRACTICE OF DENTISTRY AND THE 
CRISIS IN DENTAL EDUCATION 
A. Changes in the Practice of Dentistry 
The dental education crisis of the 1980s was precipitated by changes 
both in the practice of dentistry and in dental education.  The change in the 
practice of dentistry can be told in one word: fluoride.68  In the early 
twentieth century, dentists observed a newly recognized dental disorder.  
This disorder, then called mottled enamel, resulted in the teeth being 
permanently stained brown.  In the 1930s, research established that mottled 
enamel (now known as fluorosis) was caused by high levels of fluoride in 
children’s drinking water.69  Earlier, scientists had found a correlation, which 
they considered merely interesting but unimportant, between mottled enamel 
and resistance to tooth decay.70  After discovering the cause of fluorosis, they 
wondered whether fluoride in drinking water at levels too low to cause 
fluorosis could prevent cavities.71 
 
 
leiter/2012/10/predictions-about-closings-of-aba-accredited-law-schools-over-the-next-deca
de.html; Organ, supra note 66; Stephanie Francis Ward, 10 to 15 law schools could close if 
enrollment keeps shrinking, higher-ed market analyst says, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 1, 2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_should_help_law_schools_consolidate_says_h
igher_ed_market_analyst; Jordan Weissmann, Get Ready for Some Law Schools to Close, 
SLATE (Dec. 1, 2014, 5:06 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/ 2014/12/01/law
_school_applications_collapse_get_ready_for_schools_to_start_closing.html; Jordan 
Weissmann, Why I Bet a Professor Money that At Least One Law School Will Close, SLATE 
(Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/12/03/ why_i_just_bet_a_
professor_money_that_at_least_one_law_school_will_close.html.   
 68  See The Story of Fluoridation, NAT’L INST. OF DENTAL & CRANIOFACIAL RES., 
https://www.nidcr.nih.gov/OralHealth/Topics/Fluoride/TheStoryofFluoridation.htm (last 
updated Feb. 26, 2014).  [hereinafter Story of Fluoridation] 
 69  Id.   
 70  Id.   
 71  Id.   
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In 1945, Grand Rapids, Michigan agreed to test drinking water 
fluoridation and to allow the federal government to monitor its 30,000 
schoolchildren.72  The results were spectacular and immediate, and in 1951, 
the Surgeon General and the National Academy of Sciences formally 
recommended fluoridation.73  By the mid-1950s, the rate of cavities in Grand 
Rapids children had dropped more than 60%.74  The Institute of Medicine 
has called the success of fluoridation “one of the major public health 
achievements” of the twentieth century.75 
But that major achievement resulted in a major shift in the practice of 
dentistry.  From a public health view, the state of American oral health 
through the end of World War II was, by today’s standards, abysmal.  The 
first systematic report on dental education, in the mid-1920s, took for granted 
that most Americans had significant caries (cavities) and periodontal (gum) 
disease.76  Dentistry, the report concluded, “has been triumphant in the art of 
repair, but has been baffled by the mysteries of prevention.”77  In 1940, 
service in the armed forces required 6 opposing teeth in each jaw (i.e., 12 
teeth in total),78 but almost 9% of inductees were rejected for service because 
they did not meet this standard.79  Once the United States entered  World 
 
 72  Id.   
 73  COMM. ON THE FUTURE OF DENTAL EDUC., DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS: 
CHALLENGES AND CHANGE 37 (Marilyn J. Field ed., 1995), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/ 
4925/dental-education-at-the-crossroads-challenges-and-change [hereinafter DENTAL 
EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS].   
 74  The Story of Fluoridation, supra note 68.  
 75  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 62.   
 76  WILLIAM J. GIES, DENTAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: A REPORT 
TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 158, 226 (1926), 
https://dalspace.library.dal.ca/bitstream/handle/10222/42804/Geis_Report_Reduced_All_O
CR_150dpi_PDFA1b.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (“The tendency to irregular alignment 
in dentition appears to be growing; decay of teeth is rampant; loosening of teeth owing to 
disease of the closely investing tissues was never more common; conditions of disease at the 
roots of teeth are as numerous as ever; systemic sequelae of infection through dental channels 
have been noted in increasing incidence and variety; defective teeth are being extracted by 
the millions; and oral maladies involving both teeth and jaws, and requiring surgical attention, 
have not perceptibly decreased. . . . The boy or girl whose teeth are entirely free from caries 
is unusual; and the young man or woman without decayed teeth, or from whom teeth have not 
been extracted, or who has not had teeth filled, crowned, or replaced, is very hard to find. At 
middle age, disease of the tissues that surround the teeth is an accustomed experience; in old 
age, sound natural teeth are uncommon; and at all ages many persons suffer from infectious 
disorders that follow admission of germs through deficient dental tissues.”).   
 77  Id. at 158.   
 78  A sufficient number of opposing teeth was required so that a service person deployed 
in a theatre of operations could eat battle rations.  Maxwell H. Anderson, Dentistry and Dental 
Education in the Context of the Evolving Health Care System, 71 J. DENTAL EDUC. 988, 989 
(2007).   
 79  GEORGE F. JEFFCOTT, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY DENTAL SERVICE IN 
WORLD WAR II 199–200 (Calvin H. Goddard & Rebecca L. Duberstein, eds., 1955).   
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War II, even this minimal requirement was relaxed because the government 
realized that it would otherwise not have sufficient recruits.80  Throughout 
the war, more recruits were rejected for dental reasons than for any other 
physical cause.81 
Through the 1970s, the bread-and-butter of the general dentist (and 
80% of dentists were and are generalists) was filling cavities, especially in 
children; performing extractions; and fitting partial or complete dentures.82  
Adults typically went to the dentist to have teeth filled or extracted in 
response to pain, and replaced with artificial teeth, if they could afford it.  
They brought their children to the dentist for the same reasons, but also from 
a sense of parental duty so many childhood cavities were detected and 
repaired before the child experienced pain. 
By the late 1970s, enough children had grown up with fluoridated 
water, especially children in large population areas, and were a significant 
enough percentage of the overall urban population that the decline in tooth 
decay was evident.83  As fluoridation spread, the childhood periodic checkup 
revealed fewer and fewer cavities.  Adults kept their teeth longer too, so they 
needed fewer extractions and bridge work.84  General dentists shifted their 
focus from therapeutic and restorative work to preventative procedures.  
They also began to focus on elective procedures such as cosmetic whitening 
and orthodontics.85  Further, basic science advances increased treatment 
options in periodontics and endodontics.86  These advances coincided with 
an adult population that was retaining more of its teeth and thus was more 
susceptible to gum and root disease.87 
 
 80  Id. at 202.  
 81  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 24.   
 82  AM. DENTAL ASS’N, FUTURE OF DENTISTRY TODAY’S VISION: TOMORROW’S REALITY 
37, 52 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY]; AM. DENTAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE 
AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION’S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF DENTISTRY: ISSUE 
PAPERS ON DENTAL RESEARCH, MANPOWER, EDUCATION, PRACTICE AND PUBLIC AND 
PROFESSIONAL CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 17, 24 (1983) [hereinafter 
1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY]; William D. Hendricson & Peter A. Cohen, Future Directions 
in Dental School Curriculum, Teaching, and Learning, AM. ASS’N DENTAL SCHS., at 2 (1998).   
 83  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ORAL HEALTH IN AMERICA: A REPORT OF 
THE SURGEON GENERAL 3 (2000), https://www.nidcr.nih.gov/DataStatistics/SurgeonGeneral/ 
Documents/hck1ocv.@www.surgeon.fullrpt.pdf  [hereinafter ORAL HEALTH IN AMERICA]. 
 84  2001 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 56; 1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra 
note 82, at 5, 23.   
 85  William Mullen, The Disappearing Dentist: Researchers in a Once-Busy Profession 
Find Out They May Have Been Too Smart for Their Own Good, CHI. TRIB. (July 27, 1986), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-07-27/features/8602230796_1_fluoridation-tooth-
decay-dental-disease.   
 86  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 17; ORAL HEALTH IN AMERICA, supra 
note 83, at 18.   
 87  2001 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 32–33, 56; 1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, 
supra note 76, at 18.   
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For most general dentists, this represented a significant change in the 
professional skills they used in their  practice, changes that were not well 
received by dental specialists and which were also probably deleterious to 
the patients.88  Notwithstanding a shift in services to meet the shift in 
demand, the overall amount spent on dental services flattened while 
spending on healthcare overall increased in the 1970s.89  Clearly the practice 
of dentistry both changed and contracted in the 1970s. 
B. Changes in Dental Education 
The change in dental education that led to its crisis can be told in two 
words: money and fluoride.  In part because of the armed forces’ experience, 
the federal government took steps in the post-war period to improve 
America’s oral health.90  The government’s efforts took four forms.91  First, 
as it did with students in higher education generally, it made low cost loans 
available to dental students.92  Second, the government encouraged dental 
schools to increase their enrollment by making payments directly to the 
school based both on the number of students and on the increase in students’ 
so-called capitation payments.93 
Third, the government made a significant investment in the physical 
plant of many dental schools, through grants for capital improvements.94  
Medical students’ clinical education takes place in hospitals, which are 
separate entities from medical schools and generate significant fees that 
cover the hospital’s costs.  By contrast, dental students’ clinical training 
takes place in clinics that are owned and operated by the dental schools and 
which do not generate significant patient fees, meaning that the university 
must bear the cost of the clinics.95  Many dental schools’ clinics had not been 
updated since before World War II, and the schools were at risk of closing 
because of substandard clinical facilities.96  The schools and their universities 
 
 88  Paul Duke Jr. & Albert R. Karr, Dentists Step Up Services and Marketing as 
Competition Increases in Crowded Field, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1987, at 1.   
 89  ORAL HEALTH IN AMERICA, supra note 83, at 240.   
 90  Anderson, supra note 78, at 988–89.   
 91  See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COSTS OF EDUCATION IN THE HEALTH 
PROFESSIONS 1, 5 (1974) [hereinafter COSTS OF EDUCATION].   
 92  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 42; DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE 
CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 57; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FINANCING 
DENTAL EDUCATION: PUBLIC POLICY INTERESTS, ISSUES AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 16–
17 (2005) [hereinafter FINANCING DENTAL EDUCATION]; Jeanne C. Sinkford, The Future of 
Dentistry: New Challenges, New Directions, 82 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 353, 353 (1990). 
 93  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 22; COSTS OF EDUCATION, supra note 
91, at iii; FINANCING DENTAL EDUCATION, supra note 92; Sinkford, supra note 92, at 353. 
 94  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 22.   
 95  FINANCING DENTAL EDUCATION, supra note 92, at 14–15.   
 96  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 22.   
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were understandably reluctant to invest in dental clinics that tended not to 
earn an economic return. 
Finally, the federal government wanted to encourage research in basic 
oral health issues.  Through the end of the 1940s, dental research in basic 
science had been extremely modest.97  What innovations there were in 
dentistry tended to be in materials and techniques, which focused on repair, 
rather than in areas that were relevant to prevention of disease.98  In 1948, 
Congress established the National Institute of Dental Research (NIDR), 
which funneled research funds to dental schools.99 
The federal government’s programs had a large, successful effect on 
dental education in the thirty-five years following the end of World War II.  
By 1981, over 70% of dental students took advantage of federal loans.100  
The number of dental schools and the number of dental students both 
increased dramatically thanks to federal capitation payments and enrollment 
incentives.  In 1943, there were thirty-nine dental schools.101  That number 
increased over 50% to sixty schools by 1980.102  Most of that increase, 
thirteen of the twenty-one new schools, came after 1960 and was facilitated 
by federal grants.103  Between 1960 and 1980, most dental school facilities 
were either built from scratch or renovated thanks to federal money,104 and 
the number of full-time faculty more than doubled.105 
The number of dental students increased even more dramatically, rising 
over 90% from just under 12,000 students in 1950 to almost 23,000 students 
in 1980.106  Again, much of this increase was the result of federal capitation 
and enrollment incentive payments.107  In the area of sponsored research, the 
federal government was for all practical purposes the only sponsor.  The 
government’s NIDR accounted for 80% of all research conducted at 
American dental schools.108 
 
 
 
 
 97  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 51. 
 98  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 16; DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE 
CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 51.   
 99  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 16.   
 100  Id. at 42.   
 101  JEFFCOTT, supra note 79, at 138.   
 102  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 37.   
 103  Id.   
 104  Id.   
 105  Id.  
 106  FINANCING DENTAL EDUCATION, supra note 92, at 9.   
 107  Id. at 17.   
 108  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 16.   
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But by the late 1970s, the effects of fluoride on the practice of dentistry 
were clear and policy advisors began to suggest that the United States was at 
risk of having too many dentists.109  Congress responded in 1981 by 
eliminating, or severely reducing, funding to dental education in every area 
except for NIDR research grants.  Those grants continued at comparable, or 
even increased, levels of funding.110  But, the continuation of NIDR funding 
probably had minimal or no effect on most schools.  Research accounted for 
only about 10% of a typical dental school’s revenues, but, of course, most of 
that money had to be spent on the research being supported and thus was 
unavailable to make up for reductions in other revenue sources.111  Likewise 
the cutbacks to financing capital projects probably also had little effect on 
dental schools.  By the time the federal government stopped supporting 
capital improvements, nearly all of the nation’s dental schools had either new 
facilities or significantly refurbished space.112 
However, the financial effects of reductions in the other two categories 
of funding were dire on dental schools and dental students.  The federal 
government’s elimination of capitation and enrollment increase payments 
coupled with the reduction in federal loan availability (and increase in 
interest rates) were significant challenges for dental schools and their 
students.  Federal capitation and enrollment payments, which were 
unrestricted payments made directly to dental schools, were typically around 
one-third of a school’s total revenue.113  By 1981, these payments were 
completely eliminated.114  Dental schools suddenly found themselves in a 
financial crisis with one-third less revenue but no decrease in costs.  In fact, 
given the advances in basic and applied oral science, the costs to dental 
schools had actually increased in recent years rather than decreased, even 
with a shift to a higher percentage of part-time faculty.115  To try to maintain 
their financial status quo, schools tried to increase revenues and decrease 
 
 109  Id. at 22; DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 57–58; Mary P. 
Walker et al., Dental Education Economics: Challenges and Innovative Strategies, 72 J. 
DENTAL EDUC. 1440, 1440 (2008) (“[P]redictions for future dental need and demand were not 
realized due to the impact of fluoride.”).  
 110  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 160. 
 111  The school recovered indirect costs, which the university and the federal government 
negotiated, and some of those costs doubtless are equivalent to profit, but that amount is 
difficult to calculate and is a relatively small percentage of the overall research money.  
Further, the research money would be paid directly to the university rather than to the dental 
school, so if it existed, the amount of research money that was available to the dental school 
for operating expenses would be speculative, unpredictable, and small.  See DENTAL 
EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 149–50, 159.   
 112  See Walker et al., supra note 109, at 1440.   
 113  Id.  See also COSTS OF EDUCATION, supra note 91, at 46.   
 114  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 22, 38; Sinkford, supra note 92, at 353. 
 115  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 37.   
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costs.  On the revenue side, they could increase revenues from the clinic, the 
university, the state, or the students.  On the cost side, they could reduce 
costs of the clinic and basic science operations.116 
Of course, most schools tried a combination of all these ways.  On the 
revenue side, increasing clinical income was, for most schools, an unrealistic 
possibility.  Clinics typically broke even or cost the schools money and very 
little income could be generated by trying to streamline costs or increase 
gross revenues.117  Parent universities were understandably reluctant to 
increase support to their dental schools during a period of uncertain 
economics.118 
As federal funds dried up, one natural response was to turn to state 
governments to make up the difference.119  The states already provided 
support to dental schools, especially those at state universities.120  Because 
most newly graduated dentists practiced in the state in which they were 
trained, the states had an interest in supporting the dental schools.  However, 
by the early 1980s, state governments had their own financial difficulties and 
seemed unlikely to increase support to dental schools.121  The 1990s were no 
better.  In constant dollars, state support for dental schools declined 14% 
between 1991 and 2000.122  That left increasing student tuition as the primary 
source for replacing federal funds. 
Between 1979 and 1983, the proportion of schools’ revenue provided 
by tuition increased over 20%.123  From the student perspective, however, 
the increase in tuition was astronomical.  Tuition increased over 50% 
between 1977 and 1986.124  But, at the same time that capitation and 
enrollment funds were eliminated, the federal government cut back its loan 
program making it more difficult and expensive for students to finance their 
dental education.  The consequence was that students financed their 
education through private loans (along with some federal and state loans) 
and schools effectively cut their tuition by offering scholarships.  By the 
beginning of the 1980s, over 70% of dental students received federal student 
 
 116  Id.   
 117  Id. at 39; DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 180; FINANCING 
DENTAL EDUCATION, supra note 92, at 14–15; Walker et al., supra note 109.  
 118  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 38.   
 119  See 2001 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 112 (suggesting that dental school 
had been lobbying state legislatures for increased funding).  
 120  COSTS OF EDUCATION, supra note 91, at 16, 147.   
 121  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 38.   
 122  Howard L. Bailit & Tryfon J. Beazoglou, State Financing of Dental Education: Impact 
on Supply of Dentists, 67 J. DENTAL EDUC. 1278, 1280 (2003), http://www.jdentaled.org/ 
content/67/12/1278.long.   
 123  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 205 (stating in 1979, 
tuition was 19.3% of revenues; in 1983, it was 23.5%, an increase of 21.7%).   
 124  Id. at 206.   
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loans.125  In the three years from 1978 to 1981, dental student debt increased 
by over 50% and doubled before 1990, essentially because of an increase in 
tuition.126 
From the schools’ point of view, tuition had been on a steady increase 
even before the crisis and continued afterward.  More to the point, schools 
became more reliant upon it as a source of revenue.  The proportion of 
revenue a typical school received from tuition increased from less than 20% 
in 1979, just before the federal government cut off capitation payments, to 
almost one-third by 1996.127  In the five years between 1976 and 1980, mean 
tuition increased 63%.128  But this increase masks a great variation: public 
schools increased their tuition 24% while private schools increased theirs by 
82% over those five years.129  Once the crisis hit, the increases accelerated.  
From 1980 to 1986, public schools increased tuition by an additional 68% 
and private schools by 53%.130  These increases continued through the end 
of the 1980s.131 
One result of the changed realities of the practice of dentistry and the 
changed economics of dental education was a rapid and severe reduction in 
the number of people applying to dental school.  The high-water mark was 
in 1975 when almost 16,000 people applied to dental schools.132  In 1980, 
the year before the federal cutbacks in funding, schools saw about 9,600 
applicants.133  Within a decade, that number fell by almost half.  In 1988, and 
again in 1989, there were only 5,000 applicants.134 
 
 
 
 125  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 42.   
 126  Id. at 42, 49; DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 137; 
FINANCING DENTAL EDUCATION, supra note 92, at 5.   
 127  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 205 (in 1979 tuition was 
19.3% of revenues).  JAMES E. HARDIGAN & MICHAEL J. REED, AM. ASS’N DENTAL SCHS., THE 
COST OF ACADEMIC DENTISTRY: HOW WILL WE PAY THE BILL? 3 (1998) (noting in 1996, 
tuition was 30.3% of revenues).   
 128  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 41.   
 129  Id. (from 1976 to 1980, median public school tuition increased from $1,812 to $2,244 
and median private tuition went from $4,782 to $8,702).   
 130  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 205 (from 1980 to 1986, 
public school tuition increased from $2,244 to $3,783 and private tuition went from $8,702 to 
$13,297).   
 131  Id. (noting that in 1990, tuition at all schools was $9,427; at public schools, it averaged 
$5,106; and at private schools, it averaged $16,990).   
 132  2001 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 94; Huntly Collins, A Rush for Local 
Dental Schools, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 25, 1987), http://articles.philly.com/1987-03-
25/news/26222069_1_dental-schools-dental-program-dental-students.   
 133  AM. DENTAL EDUC. ASS’N, DENTAL SCHOOL APPLICANTS AND FIRST-TIME ENROLLEES, 
1980–2014 (2014)  [hereinafter DENTAL SCHOOL APPLICANTS]. 
 134  Id. (data points appear when moused-over).   
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As one might imagine, the quality of the applicants, by traditional 
measures of UGPA and DAT was declining, as well.135  That diminishing of 
entering credentials manifested itself several years later as new dental 
graduates failed the national boards and licensing exams in increased 
numbers.  By 1992, the number of graduates failing the exams increased by 
67% from ten years before.136  One in six graduates failed in 1992; a decade 
earlier, fewer than one in ten failed.137 
That this decline was a crisis can be seen by comparing the number of 
applicants to the number of first year students.  There were fewer applicants 
in 1988 than there were first year students in 1980.138  In 1975, the peak year 
for applications, the ratio of applicants to available seats in dental schools 
was 2.6:1.139  In 1980, the ratio had fallen to 1.6.140  1988 was the worst year 
for dental schools, with about 5,000 applicants for around 4,200 seats, a ratio 
of 1.2.141 
The dental schools responded to this crisis in relatively predictable 
ways.  In the end, as we will see, none of these responses made a significant 
difference in determining whether a school survived.  One thing many 
schools did was increase their focus on philanthropic fundraising.142  The 
reality of fundraising for educational institutions is that, with the rare 
exception of a gift so large it can truly transform an institution, gifts help 
marginally with general operations.  A major, but not transformative, gift can 
make a particular aspect of operations successful but is restricted to that 
area.143  An additional challenge to the schools at that time is that, generally 
speaking, major donors do not give simply because an institution is in 
financial difficulty, but rather, they tend to give to healthy institutions to 
build on the institution’s success.144 
Dental schools’ fundraising efforts in response to the crisis of the 1980s 
reflect these realities.  Dental school fundraising was an “unexplored source” 
of funds in the mid-1980s, which generated “insignificant” revenue.145  In 
 
 135  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 42; DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE 
CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 131, 134.   
 136  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 134.   
 137  Id.   
 138  DENTAL SCHOOL APPLICANTS, supra note 133.   
 139  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 42.   
 140  DENTAL SCHOOL APPLICANTS, supra note 133 (noting 9,601 people applied for 6,030 
first year places).   
 141  Id.   
 142  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 39; DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE 
CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 210.   
 143  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 221. 
 144  See, e.g., JEROLD PANAS, MEGA GIFTS, 29–30 (2d ed. 2005).   
 145  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 39.   
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1991, gifts to dental schools represented just over 3% of the schools’ 
revenues.  Although in the early 1990s development represented the fastest-
growing of all revenue categories, by 1996, gifts accounted for only 4.3% of 
revenue.146 
Many schools also undertook general cost-cutting measures, targeted at 
areas deemed to be less essential to the immediate well-being of the 
school.147  These areas included physical plant improvement and 
maintenance, the school’s library, and support staff.148  The danger in making 
these cuts, of course, is that a school will at some point have to refurbish its 
facilities or build new ones.  In the end, that may be more expensive than 
properly maintaining and incrementally improving its current physical plant.  
Likewise, valuable library resources and support staff are difficult to replace 
once they are cut. 
Schools also tried to increase net revenues by focusing on activities 
related to, but separate from, their core educational mission.  More 
specifically, they initiated or put more resources into landing research grants 
and into continuing dental education (CDE) programs.  By the mid-1990s, 
research funding accounted for roughly 10% of schools’ revenues.  
However, it is obvious that the vast majority of that money was spent on the 
research for which it was provided and was not available to the school to 
spend on other needs.  Schools do profit from the recovery of indirect costs, 
but those are very difficult to calculate and most schools could not provide 
significant unrestricted revenue.  Telling evidence of this is provided by the 
observation that dental school deans were split as to whether research grants 
were a potential source of significant resources.149 
CDE programs began to be offered in significant numbers in the early 
1970s, when continuing education became a prerequisite for relicensing of 
dentists.150  From the beginning, however, school-sponsored CDE programs 
typically broke even or actually lost money.151  In the turmoil of the 1980s, 
schools increased their emphasis on CDE programs, in part to increase net 
revenues.152 
 
 146  HARDIGAN & REED, supra note 127, at 3, 5.  
 147  Howard L. Bailit, The Fundamental Financial Problems of Dental Education and 
Their Impact on Education, Operations, Scholarship, and Patient Care, 72 J. DENTAL EDUC. 
14, 15 (2008), http://www.jdentaled.org/content/72/2_suppl/14.full.   
 148  Id. 
 149  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 159 n.5.  
 150  David W. Chambers, Dental Education’s Involvement with Dentists’ Learning in 
Practice: Data and Theory, 76 J. DENTAL EDUC. 107, 109 (2012).   
 151  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 76, at 39.  However, some schools managed 
to run very successful CDE programs.  Id.   
 152  Id. at 39; DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 210. See also 
2001 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 107 (noting schools also sponsored CDE 
programs to improve their relations with local practicing dentists and to help remediate 
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However, school-sponsored CDE programs were not generally 
successful and, more to the point, they were not sources of significant 
revenue for the schools.  Market factors and quality factors each played a 
part.  The barriers to entry in the CDE market were minimal and the schools 
quickly faced competition from both for-profit continuing education 
corporations and the organized dentistry groups, which added CDE 
programs at little or no cost to their regular gatherings.153  As one observer 
put it, “[s]chools’ financial structures are not suited to competition based on 
lowest cost.”154  Thus the school-sponsored CDE programs could not attract 
significant numbers of students.  Second, the quality of school-sponsored 
CDE programs was seen by practicing dentists to be lower than programs by 
other providers.155  By 1992, CDE programs contributed a miniscule 1.3% to 
dental schools’ revenues.156 
The schools also focused on making their core educational functions 
more economically viable.  The second two years of dental education are 
clinical, with students serving in clinics operated by the school itself.157  
When the major changes came to dental education, many schools looked to 
their clinics as potential sources of increased profits.158  In one sense, they 
succeeded.  In total dollars, clinic revenues increased 35% in the 1990s.159  
Clinic revenues as a percentage of school revenues increased from 12.2% in 
1983, to 16.6% in 1992, and to 18% in 1998.160  But the financial fact of 
dental clinics is that they cost more than they bring in.161  Dental students 
provide the bulk of patient care and typically can only see two or three 
 
practitioners referred to the school by licensing authorities).   
 153  Chambers, supra note 150, at 109–10.   
 154  Id. at 110. 
 155  Id. at 110; Kathleen Roth, Dental Education: A Leadership Challenge for Dental 
Educators and Practitioners, 71 J. DENTAL ED. 983, 985 (2007), http://www.jdentaled.org/ 
content/71/8/983.long. 
 156  2001 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 92.  
 157  By contrast, medical students’ clinical education takes place largely in teaching 
hospitals in which the cost is borne primarily by the hospital. FINANCING DENTAL EDUCATION, 
supra note 92, at 14-15. 
 158  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 39 (The schools also looked to increase 
their clinic’s profitability by reducing costs through such measures as “streamlining” their 
procedures, having the clinical faculty member perform some procedures, and controlling 
inventory costs and accounting.). See DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 
73, at 213; Jeanne C. Sinkford, Effect of Economic Pressures on Dental Education at Howard 
University, 76 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 15, 17 (1984) (noting inventory control, bulk purchasing 
and competitive bidding among the measures implemented by Howard University).  Whether 
the schools succeeded in reducing costs is not known, but as documented below, costs 
continued to outstrip revenues by a considerable margin.   
 159  Walker et al., supra note 109, at 1442.   
 160  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 39.   
 161  Id.; DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 180.   
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patients per day.162  Students are expected to perform a wide array of 
procedures, with which they have had little to no experience.  The 
overarching attitude is that the clinic’s primary mission is to educate students 
rather than to provide patient care.163 
Unlike medical education, in which a broad section of the public 
typically uses medical services in a teaching hospital, dental clinics tend to 
serve patients who cannot afford private dentists.  Many patients are covered 
by Medicare, which pays very little for dental services.164  The consequence 
of the patient mix and the general quality of the dental services rendered by 
students who have not received the DDS is that clinics tend to charge about 
half of the local market rate.165  In the typical dental school clinic, costs are 
three times the revenues.166  Thus, although the schools succeeded in 
bringing in more revenue, they did so in a dynamic that increasingly cost 
them money rather than generating net revenue. 
Dental education as a whole worked to change its curriculum during 
the crisis.  Of course because of the crisis, schools strove to change their 
curriculum in hopes of reducing costs.167  It seems unlikely, however, that 
any curriculum changes actually resulted in an ultimate net reduction in 
costs.  To the extent that any savings in costs were achieved, it seems to have 
been largely from outsourcing instruction in some of the first two years’ 
courses to the medical school, which saved little in cost but hampered the 
dental schools’ control over content.168 
One popular curricular change was to attempt to make its graduates 
more practice-ready in an environment in which dental care was shifting to 
preventative care.169  But schools did not move away from their focus on 
training general practitioners rather than dental specialists, a focus that had 
been in place since the 1920s.170  In truth, though, much of the impetus for 
curricular reform was of the evergreen variety and did not stem from the 
crisis in dental education.171  Although dental schools implemented various 
 
 162  Walker et al., supra note 109, at 1442.   
 163  FINANCING DENTAL EDUCATION, supra note 92, at 14.   
 164  Id. at 15.   
 165  Id.   
 166  Id. at 14; Walker et al., supra note 109.   
 167  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 210, 214.   
 168  Id. at 97.   
 169  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 45.   
 170  2001 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 106; DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE 
CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 47, 94.  The first systematic study of American dental 
education recommended that dental schools focus on training generalists rather than 
specialists. GIES, supra note 76, at 190–92, 
 171  Hendricson & Cohen, supra note 82, at 5.   
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curricular reforms,172 the end result of the dental education crisis was “some 
growth and little change.”173  As with much of higher education, curriculum 
reform in dental schools, even in the face of an existential crisis, was 
thwarted in predictable ways.  Most saliently, faculty recalcitrance, financial 
limitations, and a perceived disconnect between a reformed curriculum and 
licensure tests prevented widespread change.174  As Derek Bok is said to have 
said, changing the curriculum “is like trying to move a graveyard.”175 
Dental schools reduced the size of their entering classes.  Doubtless the 
vast majority of this reduction was simply a reflection that there were 
insufficient qualified applicants to fill the number of seats available.176  As 
noted, because dental clinics are owned and operated by the schools, a 
reduction in class size does little to reduce costs.  Rather, the high percentage 
of fixed costs must be spread over fewer students, resulting in a need to 
increase tuition even more.177 
The high-water mark for dental school enrollment was in 1980 when 
over 6,000 first year students began their studies.  The number of first-year 
students declined steadily in each of the next nine admissions cycles.  At the 
bottom, in 1989, fewer than 4,000 people began dental studies.178  First-year 
enrollment fell by 34% in less than ten years.  By the early 1990s, total dental 
school enrollment fell the equivalent of 20 average-sized dental schools.179  
Of course, not every school’s enrollment declined in the same proportion.  In 
fact, some schools increased their enrollment.180  Of those that saw declines, 
the reductions ranged from negligible to 50%.181 
 
 172  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 97, 210; Hendricson & 
Cohen, supra note 82, at 5; Denise K. Kassebaum et al., The Dental Curriculum at North 
American Dental Institutions in 2002–03: A Survey of Current Structure, Recent Innovations, 
and Planned Changes, 68 J. DENTAL EDUC. 914, 914–15 (2004), http://www.jdentaled.org/ 
content/68/9/914.full.pdf+html.   
 173  Kassebaum et al., supra note 172, at 915 (quoting L.A. Tedesco, Issues in Dental 
Curriculum and Change, 59 J. DENTAL EDUC. 97 (1995)).   
 174  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 100; Kenneth L. Kalkwarf 
et al., ADEA Commission on Change and Innovation in Dental Education, 69 J. DENTAL 
EDUC. 1085, 1085 (2005), http://www.jdentaled.org/content/69/10/1085.full.   
 175  See Stacy JoIna, Harvard Education: A Matter of Coping, Not Facts, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 21, 1979), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/09/21/harvard-educ
ation-a-matter-of-coping-not-facts/43d82428-f93f-4e92-b48f-1b5e90298d45/.   
 176  See supra note 135.   
 177  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 40.   
 178  DENTAL SCHOOL APPLICANTS, supra note 133 (noting 6,030 first year students begin 
in 1980; 3,979 began in 1989).   
 179  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 26.  (noting total 
enrollment was 22,235 in 1982, and 15,980 in 1992, a decline of 6,255 students).  Sixty dental 
schools existed in 1982, with average enrollment of 371.  Hence, 6,255 was the equivalent of 
20 average-sized schools.  Id. at 132.   
 180  Id. at 132.   
 181  Id. at 26.   
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But the reduction in class size did not keep pace with the decline in 
applicants.  On the cusp of the crisis, in 1980, dental schools enrolled 63% 
of applicants.182  Eight years later, the schools enrolled 84% of those who 
applied.183 
Finally, dental schools cut costs by reducing and changing the 
composition of their faculty.  In the heyday of the 1970s, schools increased 
the number of full-time faculty by 75% and full-time faculty became a larger 
percentage of the total faculty.184  As the crisis took hold, faculties became 
smaller.  In the eight years between 1986 and 1994, dental faculties shrank 
by 14%.185  This reduction was not evenly felt on faculties.  Basic science 
faculty, those who teach in the first two years of the program, fell by 27%, 
while clinical faculty fell by only 10%.186  At the same time, schools began 
a strategy of hiring full-time faculty in non-tenure track positions.  In 1980, 
when dental schools were thriving, almost all full-time faculty were tenured 
or tenure-track.  By the mid-1990s, when the effects of the crisis were in full 
force, tenured or tenure-track full-time faculty were less than three-quarters 
of the total.187 
III. UNIVERSITIES CLOSE 12% OF THE NATION’S DENTAL SCHOOLS 
Emory University’s board of trustees was the first to act.  In the spring 
of 1985, they voted to admit no dental students in 1986, teach out the current 
students, and close the school of dentistry when the last class graduated in 
1988.188  Presumably because the university was stuck with a purpose-built 
dental school facility, the university focused on its one-year post-DDS 
residency program, but closed that in 1990.189  The dean of the dental school 
 
 182  DENTAL SCHOOL APPLICANTS, supra note 133 (9,601 people applied to dental schools 
and 6,030 began studies).   
 183  Id. (5,019 people applied to dental schools and 4,196 began studies).   
 184  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 40–41 (full-time faculty went from 34% 
to 44% of the entire faculty during the 1970s).   
 185  2001 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 99 (Table 6.6).   
 186  James E. Kennedy & Ronald J. Hunt, Meeting the Demand for Future Dental Faculty, 
AM. DENTAL EDUC. ASS’N 1–2 (Oct. 1998), http://www.adea.org/publications/Pages/
75thAnniversarySummitReport.aspx.   
 187  Id. at 2 (stating 92% of full-time faculty were tenured or tenure-track in 1980, but it 
declined to 72% in 1995).   
 188  Trustees of Emory University To Eliminate Dental School, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 1985), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/02/13/us/trustees-of-emory-university-to-eliminate-dental-
school.html.   
 189  See Betsy A. Lehman, The ‘80s Are Going to Hurt Just a Little; Profession on 
Downswing After Surge in the ‘70s, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 29, 1985, at 37; Emory School of 
Dentistry Records, 1944-1991, EMORY UNIV. SCH. OF DENTISTRY, https://finding
aids.library.emory.edu/documents/HS-S012/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (noting last record 
of 1991 reflecting the closure of the program).   
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resigned, apparently more out of despair than anger.190  The university said 
the board’s decision was based on a dearth of qualified students.191  The dean 
said that the dental school had been losing money year after year.192  The 
school had seen a 67% decline in applicants, suggesting that enrolling 
students at all, “qualified” or not, was an increasing challenge.193  The dean, 
rather candidly, suggested that it was the lack of applicants, rather than their 
quality, that was the final factor in the board’s decision.194  There is some 
suggestion, as well, that Emory’s dental school tuition was too high 
compared to that of other regional dental schools.195  Two years later, the 
university spun its decision as one based primarily on quality.  “‘[T]he 
university decided it would be better to spend money for a program that 
would be on the cutting edge of training and research,’ said Steven Budnick, 
an associate dean at Emory’s School of Dentistry[.]”196 
Four months later, another university administration decided to close a 
dental school.  In June, Oral Roberts University (ORU) announced that its 
dental school would close after the next academic year.197  Unlike at Emory, 
ORU did not provide for a teach-out of its current students.  It admitted no 
class in 1985 and graduated its seniors, but only provided assistance in 
transferring to its sophomores and juniors.198  At the time of the 
announcement, ORU blamed its own dental graduates for the closing.  The 
graduates had not, the university said, gone into foreign missions upon 
graduation.  ORU claimed that such mission work was the premise upon 
which it had solicited donations to the dental school, and the graduates’ 
decisions to enter private practice undermined support for the dental 
school.199  Even at the time of the announcement, others claimed that the real 
reason for the closure was that the school itself was not generating net 
revenues.200  In reality, serious financial trouble at the university level, not 
 
 190  Lehman, supra note 189 (quoting the dean as saying he could not bear telling his 
colleagues that their jobs were gone).   
 191  Trustees of Emory University, supra note 188.  
 192  Lehman, supra note 189.   
 193  Id.   
 194  Id.   
 195  Id.; Jamie Talan, Your Health Focus on Dentistry The Changing Face of Dentistry in 
the ‘Look, Ma, No Cavities’ World, Schools Are Closing, Patients Are Older, NEWSDAY, Feb. 
27, 1990, at 14.   
 196  Larry Gordon, Declining Rolls: U.S. Dental Schools Feel the Crunch, L.A. TIMES 
(Oct. 26, 1987), http://articles.latimes.com/1987-10-26/news/mn-10931_1_private-dental-
school/2.   
 197 ORU Phasing Out School of Dentistry, TULSA WORLD (June 22, 1985), 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/archives/oru-phasing-out-school-of-dentistry/article_227695b4-
402b-5d24-95db-0f26ba8c9f07.html.   
 198  Id.   
 199  Id.   
 200  Id.   
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simply at the dental school, led to the decision to close the dental school.201 
Georgetown University, the largest private dental school, was the next 
to close.  Georgetown hired a major accounting firm to audit the dental 
school at the beginning of the 1986 academic year.202  By the end of the fall 
semester, the report was finished.203  It predicted a $3.5 million loss for the 
school within the next five years.204  In December 1986, the Georgetown 
board asked the dental school to prepare a plan to cut costs and raise 
revenue.205  The school responded with a plan to reduce the size of the school 
by one-third.206  In March 1987, the Georgetown board voted to close the 
school anyway.207  As Emory did, Georgetown provided a teach-out of 
current students, with the final class being graduated in 1990.208 
Georgetown explained its decision as a concern over tightening dental 
school finances in the near future.209  The university said it needed 150 first-
year students to support the school financially, but that the school was below 
that target in the fall of 1986, and projections indicated an increasingly small 
first-year class over the next few years.210  However, admissions were less 
than 10% below the target number, surely not a dire situation.211 
 
 
 
 201  Kiera Feldman, This Is My Beloved Son, THIS LAND (Oct. 2, 2014), 
http://thislandpress.com/2014/10/02/this-is-my-beloved-son/; Cathy Milam, Roberts to Close 
Hospital, Medical School, TULSA WORLD (Sept. 14, 1989), http://www.tulsaworld.com/ 
archives/roberts-to-close-hospital-medical-school/article_c3f5b934-9e73-5ca2-89ef-
db0962b5162a.html.   
 202  Lawrence Feinberg, Dental School Closing’s Bitter Taste, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 
1987), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1987/03/29/dental-school-closings-
bitter-taste/f8871c26-a865-497b-9057-66c532d89946/?utm_term=.829e9d305949.  
 203  Lawrence Feinberg, GU Defends Dental School Closure, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 
1987), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1987/03/24/gu-defends-dental-school
-closure/697c6b90-5bb1-43c8-9db3-4b3e1460bed6/?utm_term=.1d7c40a7c5db.   
 204  Id.   
 205  Lawrence Feinberg, Plea to Save Dental School Rebuffed, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 
1987), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1987/10/23/plea-to-save-dental-scho
ol-rebuffed/dbf9f03a-8f91-4c1a-a827-2262f94ab7f2/?utm_term=.122ba5ed1e92.   
 206  Feinberg, supra note 202.   
 207  Marcia Slacum Greene, Georgetown University to Shut Down Dental School, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 21, 1987), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1987/03/21/ george
town-university-to-shut-down-dental-school/30e8c158-d9b6-4adc-abb9-
d15277b0881a/?utm_term=.69ac7a2a8755.   
 208  Id.   
 209  Paul Page, Country’s Largest Private Dental School to Close, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Mar. 23, 1987.   
 210  Feinberg, supra note 203 (noting the school had 137 first-year students in the 1986-
1987 year, and the university had projected 120 in the 1987 entering class and classes below 
100 soon after that).   
 211  Id. (stating the school had 137 first-year students in the 1986-1987 year, 8.7% under 
its target).   
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The finances disclosed by Georgetown seem in line with the general 
state of dental schools in that era and are suggestive of the financial pressures 
faced by many other dental schools.  The university admitted that the school 
was in the black in 1986-1987, with 570 total students, including 120-first 
years.212  Assuming a total of 570 students was at or close to the break-even 
point, total enrollment in 1987-1988 was projected to have been about 545, 
or 25 students below break-even.213  At $15,900 tuition, the school would be 
about $400,000 short of the roughly $9 million in tuition that 570 students 
would have produced.214  At a steady state of 400 total students (i.e., 100 
first-year students) with no tuition increase, the school would generate about 
$3.2 million less than with 570 students.215  However, tuition constituted 
only about 62% of the school’s total revenues, suggesting that the school 
took in about $14.5 million per year with 570 students.216  Reducing the 
student body by one-third (i.e., entering classes of 100 instead of 150), would 
result in a decline in total revenues of about 22%.217 
Fairleigh Dickinson’s dental school was the fourth to announce a 
closing.  Like Oral Roberts, Fairleigh Dickinson’s precipitating cause was 
financial trouble outside the school.  In the 1980s, the university faced 
declining enrollment in its programs and rising costs.  It also had several 
campuses and a wide range of programs that compounded its financial 
problems.  It sold land, converted dormitories to condos, and ended 
numerous small-enrollment programs.  Nonetheless, in the 1988-1989 year, 
it found itself with a $17 million deficit on a $95 million operating budget.218 
The dental school, like many schools at private universities, received 
significant funds from the state, essentially to subvene the dental education 
of residents who were likely to remain in-state.  New Jersey provided $4.8 
million of the dental school’s $12.4 million budget.  Even with that money, 
the school had run a deficit of $1.6 million in 1988.219  The school apparently 
also had some deferred maintenance costs to bring its clinical facilities up to 
contemporary standards.220  By early 1989, New Jersey decided that it would 
no longer both subvene Fairleigh Dickinson’s dental school and fund the 
wholly public New Jersey Dental School, then part of the University of 
 
 212  Feinberg, supra note 202.   
 213  Feinberg, supra note 210.   
 214  Page, supra note 209 (noting tuition would be $15,900).   
 215  Id.   
 216  Id.   
 217  Id.   
 218  Anthony DePalma, Its Boom Years Over, a School Regroups, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 
1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/08/nyregion/its-boom-years-over-a-school-regroup
s.html (describing the university’s financial plight).   
 219  Id.   
 220  Id.   
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Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey.221  The university was informed that 
the state’s contribution to the dental school would be cut by 25% for the next 
academic year and eliminated entirely the year after that.  The loss of state 
money, coupled with the dental school’s on-going operational deficit, meant 
that the university would be facing a $6.2 million deficit from the dental 
school alone.222  Given the university’s financial circumstances, it decided in 
the spring of 1989 to close the dental school at the end of the 1989-1990 
year.223  The school enrolled no first-year students in the fall of 1989 and 
spent the 1989-1990 year working with its sophomores and juniors to 
transfer them to other schools.224 
Three other universities closed their dental schools as well.  
Washington University made the decision to close its school in June 1989.225  
Rumors had been circulating in the press that the university might close the 
school because it was running a $240,000 deficit; however, the deficit was 
hardly a financial disaster at only about 4%.226  Until the 1988-1989 year, the 
school had been profitable or broke even.227  The deficit was caused by the 
loss of twelve students who transferred or dropped out.  An internal report 
suggested that the school needed an infusion of $6 million per year to stay 
afloat.228  As with Fairleigh Dickinson, the state’s higher education officials 
were not interested in supporting a portion of the private school’s budget 
because the state was already supporting the entire cost of another dental 
school at the University of Missouri, Kansas City.229  The school predicted 
four to five years of deficits, $240,000 in the current year, increasing to 
$450,000 the next year.230  The school took no first-year dental students in 
1989, taught out the rising third- and fourth-year students, helped the rising 
second-year students to transfer, and closed in 1991.231  Although the 
university framed the decision as financial and not quality-driven, it is clear 
 
 221  Beukas v. Bd. of Trs. of Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 605 A.2d 776, 778 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1991); DePalma, supra note 218.   
 222  Beukas, 605 A.2d at 778.   
 223  Id. at 778; DePalma, supra note 218.   
 224  Id. at 779; DePalma, supra note 218.   
 225  Robert Manor, WU Dental School to Close By 1992, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 
3, 1989.   
 226  Louis J. Rose, WU May Close School of Dentistry, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 
13, 1989 (noting a $240,000 deficit on a $6 million budget).   
 227  Jo Mannies, Down in the Mouth U.S. Dental Schools Facing New Crunches, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, May 19, 1989.   
 228  Mark Schlinkmann, State Aid Is Sought for Dental School, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
May 14, 1989.   
 229  Lorraine Kee Montre, Washington U. Dental Students Not Surprised By Closure Talk, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 15, 1989.   
 230  Jo Mannies, Slack Demand Helped to Seal Fate of Dental School, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, June 4, 1989; Manor, supra note 225.   
 231  Manor, supra note 225.   
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that the dental school’s perceived lack of prestige and quality in comparison 
to other Washington University units played a large part in the university’s 
decision.232 
Two Chicago-area dental schools closed within a few years of one 
another.  The president of Loyola University of Chicago said the dental 
school had been operating at a loss for eleven years before the decision to 
close it was made.233  Loyola allowed the school to remain open for only one 
more year, leaving two classes of students scrambling to transfer.234  Finally, 
Northwestern University effectively decided in 1997 to close its dental 
school after a full teach-out of its students.235  Financial considerations surely 
played a part in this decision, but it seems apparent that the primary factor 
was the perceived lack of prestige and quality of the dental school compared 
to the rest of the university. 
Northwestern’s decision to close came five years after Loyola’s 
decision.  More importantly, in terms of university motivation and lessons 
for legal education, by the time Northwestern decided to close its dental 
school, the economics of dental education had rebounded.  In fact, 
applications to Northwestern’s dental school had increased by 300% since 
the bottom of the trough and the dental school was the most selective 
university program after the medical school.236 
 
 
 
 
 
 232  Jo Mannies, Washington University: Sellint [sic] Out Scholarship?, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, June 4, 1989 (quoting the chair of the university’s board of trustees as saying that 
academic quality played a part, the dental school would need significant additional resources 
to become excellent and that, “We don’t want to operate anything that’s mediocre”); Manor, 
supra note 225.   
 233  Lou Ortiz, Loyola Dental School to Close: Judge Rejects Suit by Students, CHI. SUN 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1992.   
 234  Monique Parsons, Loyola Closing Dental School, CHI. TRIB. (June 9, 1992), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-06-09/news/9202210216_1_dentists-students-
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 235  Stephanie Banchero & Sheryl Kennedy, NU’s Image Lurke Behind Dental Plan, CHI. 
TRIB. (Dec. 17, 1997), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-12-17/news/9712170048_
1_dental-school-dental-education-professional-schools (noting that Northwestern decided to 
admit no first-year dental students for the Fall of 1998); Patrice M. Jones, Nu Board to Close 
Up Its School of Dentistry: Trustees Decide Class Of 2001 To Be The Last CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 
3, 1998), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-03-03/news/9803030253_1_dental-stude
nts-dental-schools-nu (noting a full teach-out through Spring 2001).   
 236  Matt Dunn,  A Monumental Gaffe, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 2, 1998), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/1998-02-02/news/9802020027_1_dental-care-dental-aptitude-test-
national-dental-examinations.   
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IV. JUST LIKE PULLING TEETH—LESSONS FROM THE DENTAL EDUCATION 
CRISIS 
It would be natural to try to synthesize lessons for law schools from 
these dental school closings.  Certainly the schools that closed had several 
common elements.  In almost every case, the dental school was operating at 
a loss.  Entering classes had gotten smaller, a reflection of the declining 
number and quality of the national applicant pool.  All were a part of private 
universities, although the dental school at Fairleigh Dickinson received 
considerable state subvention.  At schools that competed with nearby public 
schools, the challenge may have been particularly difficult because the 
private schools were unable to charge tuition anywhere close to that charged 
by the public schools.237  In some instances, the university’s financial 
pressures precipitated the dental school’s demise.238  At the more elite 
universities, the dental school was said, overtly, not to be of sufficiently high 
quality to keep afloat.239 
But at least eleven other dental schools were publicly reported to have 
been in danger of closing, yet were not closed.240  These schools shared many 
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GPAs fall to bad economy, AIDS fears, HOUS. CHRONS., Jan. 19, 1992, at A7 (discussing 
Marquette University); Dental School Gets Guarantee, For Now, CAP. TIMES, May 9, 1991 
(discussing Marquette University); Bill Schackner, Dental School Filled with Debate, PITT. 
POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 25, 1994 (discussing University of Pittsburgh); Janelle Carter, Black 
College Students Oppose Merging, Closing Their Schools, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, 
Dec. 3, 1993 (discussing University of Mississippi); Gordon, supra note 195 (discussing 
University of Mississippi); Gordon, supra note 195 (discussing University of Minnesota); 
Gregor W. Pinney, University Fails to Focus Despite Attempts, It Hasn’t Pared Down, STAR 
TRIB., May 30, 1995 (discussing University of Minnesota); Dental Debate Resumes, CIN. 
POST, Dec. 17, 1992 (discussing both public dental schools in Kentucky (University of 
Kentucky and University of Louisville)); Dental-School Closing Proposal Under Fire at UK 
and U of L, COURIER & PRESS (Evansville, IN), Nov. 4, 1993 at A4 ((discussing both public 
dental schools in Kentucky (University of Kentucky and University of Louisville)); Education 
Task Force Quarreling, KY. POST, Nov. 2, 1993 (discussing both public dental schools in 
Kentucky (University of Kentucky and University of Louisville)); Lehman, supra note 
189(discussing both public dental schools in Kentucky (University of Kentucky and 
University of Louisville)); Cheryl Truman, Emotions Entangle Debate Over Dental Schools, 
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of the same elements as the schools that did close.  For example, many of the 
schools were reported to have been facing operating losses.241  As 
knowledgeable observers have remarked, nearly every dental school lost 
money from continuing operations, if for no other reason than the clinical 
aspects of dental education cost more than they produced in revenue.242  It is 
likely, then, that not only did the closed schools and those at risk of closure 
run at a loss, but the vast majority of other dental schools did, and do, too.243 
Other challenges faced by the schools that closed, the schools at risk,244 
and dental schools generally during this period, were declining applications, 
declining quality of applicants, and consequently smaller entering classes.245  
One theme that was shared by the schools that closed and the schools at risk 
of closure—but not necessarily by other dental schools—was that the 
university itself was in financial straits, especially those at-risk schools at 
public universities, which saw cuts at the state level.246 
Ultimately it will be the boards of universities, boards of stand-alone 
law schools, and occasionally state legislatures that decide whether to close 
their law schools.  Typically, boards will make those decisions based upon 
recommendations from the president or provost; seldom, if ever, would a 
 
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, July 15, 1985 (discussing both public dental schools in 
Kentucky (University of Kentucky and University of Louisville)); Todd Ackerman, Dental 
Students Fear State Disregard/Protesters See Stepchildren Status, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 15, 
1992 (discussing both public dental schools in Texas (Houston and San Antonio)); Albert R. 
Karr, A Special News Report on People and Their Jobs in Offices, Fields and Factories, WALL 
ST. J., May 19, 1987 (discussing The University of Colorado); Gordon, supra note 195 
(discussing the University of Colorado); Karr supra note 240 (discussing the University of 
Colorado); Samuel Weiss, Education; Cost of Dental Training Hits a Crisis Point, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1982 (discussing New York University).   
 241  See, e.g., Funk, supra note 240 (reporting a $562,000 deficit for 1987-1988 and a 
$479,000 deficit for 1988-1989); Dental School Gets Guarantee, For Now, supra note 240 
(noting that Marquette reportedly needed an infusion of $4.7 million to stay afloat); 
Schackner, supra note 240 (noting that Pittsburgh reportedly was running a deficit of $3.4 
million per year, the largest of Pitt’s 16 academic units,); Weiss, supra note 240 (noting that 
NYU reportedly was running a $2.6 million deficit).   
 242  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 39; DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE 
CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 180; ROBERT L. WILLIAMS, FROM DEPARTMENTAL MERGERS 
TO SCHOOL CLOSINGS: LESSONS IN ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN DENTAL EDUCATION 4 
(1998), http://www.adea.org/publications/Documents/7williams.pdf; Schackner, supra note 
240. 
 243  HARDIGAN & REED, supra note 127, at 7.   
 244  See, e.g., Farkas, supra note 240 (discussing Case Western University); Schackner, 
supra note 240 (discussing Pittsburgh); Weiss, supra note 240 (discussing NYU).   
 245  See generally, Lau, supra note 237 (the most significant factor was declining 
admissions).   
 246  See, e.g., Bauder, supra note 240; Freedman, supra note 240; Gordon, supra note 196 
(discussing the University of Mississippi); Ackerman, supra note 240 (noting that the Houston 
branch of the University of Texas’s dean and associate dean resigned over budget cuts 
imposed on the school); Karr, supra note 240 (discussing the University of Oklahoma).   
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university board close a school over the president’s strong objection.247  In 
general, university presidents’ reputations and legacies are not enhanced by 
closing academic programs.248 
Although boards are not immune from the pressures of the market, their 
actions are not exclusively, or perhaps even primarily, market-driven.  While 
every law school is unhappy in its own way, so to speak, the criteria that 
boards will use to decide which law schools are closed are likely to be similar 
across institutions.  At bottom, the board will ask whether the law school is 
providing benefits to the university and whether those benefits outweigh the 
costs.  Perhaps most critically, boards will consider the law school’s 
vibrancy.  This is another way of saying that, in the end, decision makers 
will have to assess whether law schools have the resources and the 
motivation to bring sufficient benefits in the future.  The crisis in dental 
education revealed the criteria and dynamics that likely inform boards’ 
decisions about law schools today.  One set of considerations is financial.  
Another is operational.  In light of the dental education crisis, we can identify 
the way forward for law schools to increase the likelihood that they will 
remain in good standing with their boards.  An important, but indirect, lesson 
of the dental education crisis is the system of prestige and rankings within 
legal education.  Although many if not most observers of legal education 
decry rankings, dental schools suffered during the crisis from a lack of a 
prestige system and from the absence of rankings. 
A. Financial 
1. Decreased Revenues and Increased Costs 
As we saw with dental schools, operating losses standing alone do not 
put a school in danger of being closed.  Conversely, a stable economic 
position does not make a school immune from closure.  For example, 
Georgetown closed its dental school although the school was generating 
more revenues than costs.249  Washington University’s dental school was 
closed with a deficit of only 4%.250  It seems likely that boards will treat law 
schools in the same way.  Lack of profitability can be a factor in the decision, 
but it is likely not determinative.  Rather, lack of profitability is likely to be 
used externally to justify a decision made primarily based on other factors.  
If failing to generate excess revenues were sufficient to close a law school, 
 
 247  See Rick Bales, What Would an Efficient Market for Law Schools Look Like?, L. 
DEANS ON LEGAL EDUC. BLOG (Oct. 7, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/law
_deans/2016/10/what-would-an-efficient-market-for-law-schools-look-like.html.   
 248  Id.   
 249  Feinberg, supra note 202.   
 250  Rose, supra note 226 (noting a $240,000 deficit on a $6 million budget).   
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the boards at dozens and dozens of institutions would have done so.251  In the 
dental school crisis, Loyola University closed its dental school but admitted 
that the school had run at a loss for the eleven years before the decision.  
Obviously the school’s finances were not the primary cause of the decision 
to close the dental school.252 
One study of the dental school crisis observed that financial losses 
alone cannot explain school closures, 
In all of the closings, the one common denominator has been the 
cost of educating dental students. . . . On average, the dental 
schools that closed had budgets of around $5 million and deficits 
of around $400,000.  Most had gone through attempts to reduce 
costs.  While not all universities involved went so far as to say that 
cost was the only factor, none denied that it was a major 
consideration.  But why only dental schools?  Medical education 
costs were also rising in the late 1980s and early 1990s at the same 
time that medical reimbursements were falling. . . . The response 
to the Pew commission’s recommendations for closing 10 percent 
of the medical education programs has not led to one closing.253 
Further, even if a law school is running in the black, the board will 
assess the law school’s finances in light of the other academic units in the 
university, such as the general undergraduate units,254 specialized 
undergraduate units such as the business school or education school, a 
graduate school, and other professional schools such as a nursing school or 
architecture school.255  In some instances these assessments are comparative, 
and in other instances they involve assessing the degree to which or the 
success in which one school’s efforts involve synergies and collaboration 
with other academic units. 
Moreover, a university’s own financial issues might spur the university 
to close a school, even when the school itself is not running in the red.  Both 
Oral Roberts University and Fairleigh Dickinson University decided to close 
their dental schools primarily because of financial problems at the university 
rather than at the dental school.  The dental schools at several other 
 
 251  Brown, supra note 29; Yellen, supra note 29; Gold, supra note 1; Matasar, supra note 
29; Wu, supra note 29; Barnhizer, supra note 29; Leichter, supra note 41; Standard & Poor’s, 
supra note 25, at 1, 9; Campos, supra note 42(estimating that only 15% to 20% of law schools 
currently generate revenues in excess of costs).   
 252  Ortiz, supra note 233.   
 253  WILLIAMS, supra note 242, at 2.   
 254  Often referred to as the school of arts and sciences, although at some institutions the 
sciences are in a separate unit from the other undergraduate units.   
 255  Some professional schools have both undergraduate and graduate curricula.  For 
example, a school of nursing may offer a B.S.N. as well as a M.S.N.  Further, some specialized 
undergraduate units such as the business school may offer some graduate degrees (e.g., an 
executive M.B.A.) while focusing on undergraduate education.   
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universities were in serious jeopardy of being closed because of the 
university’s money troubles.256 
Typically, a law school’s financial health worsens primarily because its 
revenues decrease.  Less typically, rising costs can be the primary cause of a 
decline in a law school’s finances.  A decrease in law school revenues might 
not be directly related to the law school’s operations.  In public schools, 
funding is sometimes allocated by the state legislature directly to the school 
or to residents studying in that discipline.257  That funding may be reduced 
or eliminated for reasons that are not related to the school’s operations.258  
For example, the legislature or the state’s higher education board may decide 
that the state has enough practitioners in a particular profession for the 
foreseeable future and thus may decide to no longer subsidize that 
education.259  Occasionally, a legislature or state higher education board may 
cut targeted funding for essentially political reasons.260  Thus, funds to the 
school may be reduced or eliminated even though the school itself is 
otherwise thriving.  If replacement funds cannot be found to cover the deficit, 
the governing board may decide to close the school.  Obviously, the most 
realistic source of such funds would be to increase student tuition.261 
Although many people might assume that a law school automatically 
has complete control over the tuition its students pay, in fact, tuition from all 
students belongs to the university, which generally can allocate those funds 
as it sees fit.  The ABA only requires the university to explain to the law 
 
 256  Freedman, supra note 240, at 21 (stating that the decline in state budget funding lead 
to discussions of closing the two SUNY dental schools).   
 257   Connie Lenz, The Public Mission of the Public Law School Library, 105 L. LIBR. J. 
31, 40 n.67 (2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2101234; LSU 
Louisiana State University, Statement of Revenues, Expenses and Changes in Net Assets As 
of June 30, 2012 and 2011, (June 30, 2012), https://www.lsu.edu/administration/ofa/oas/
far/supplement-financial-reports/fy2012/br/SRECNA_BR_FY12.pdf; Texas Tech University 
Institutional Research, Formula Funding Codes and Rates for FY 2014 and FY 2015 
Biennium—SB1, TEX. TECH UNIV. (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.depts.ttu.edu/irim/
FormulaFunding/FormulaFundingFY2014-15.pdf.   
 258  E.g., Matthew Watkins, Texas colleges fret about $1 billion in expected funding 
missing from budget plan, TEXAS TRIBUNE, Jan. 24, 2017, https://www.texastribune.org/
2017/01/24/universities-worry-about-1-billion-worth-funds-exc/.  
 259  Dental-School Closing Proposal Under Fire at UK and U of L, supra note 240.  
 260  Rob Christensen, The GOP crafts a message to UNC, with a chain saw, THE NEWS & 
OBSERVER, May 19, 2017, http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/politics-
columns-blogs/rob-christensen/article151560512.html; Richard Fausset, University of North 
Carolina Board Closes 3 Centers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2015, at A11; Gabriel Nelson, Law 
Students’ Role in Farm Pollution Suit Angers Md. Lawmakers, Sparks Nat’l Debate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/04/08/08greenwire-law-students-
role-in-farm-pollution-suit-anger-96381.html?pagewanted=all; Ian Urbina, School Law 
Clinics Face a Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/04/04/us/04lawschool.html?_r=0. 
 261  Lenz, supra note 257. 
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school how law school-generated funds are used for non-law school 
purposes.262  The 2014 revision of the ABA’s Standards for Approval of Law 
Schools eliminated a presumption that law school-generated revenues would 
be used for law school purposes.263  A school might see a decrease in its net 
allocation from the university because the university desires to re-direct 
those funds elsewhere either because the university central functions are in 
need of more funds or because the university believes that those funds are 
better allocated to other units.264 
Financially, the traditional rule of thumb for measuring a law school 
was whether its operating costs could be kept to 80% of its tuition revenues 
net of financial aid.  The remaining 20% could then be re-allocated by the 
university to other academic units or for central administration costs.265  
Many, perhaps most, law schools now run at a break-even level or consume 
funds from the university.266  The question for university board members 
then will be whether and for how long the university can tolerate this 
reduction of law school financial contribution or how long and to what extent 
the university can and will subsidize the law school financially.  Overarching 
this is whether the law school and university believe that the current setting 
is the new normal or whether they will take actions designed to restore the 
law school to being a net producer of revenues.267 
 
 262  ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 202(b) (2017-2018) [hereinafter 
ABA STANDARDS]. 
 263  Id.; cf. ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 210(c) (2013-2014) (“The 
resources generated by a law school that is part of a university should be made available to 
the law school to maintain and enhance its program of legal education.”).   
 264  While virtually every university identifies academic units that it believes are 
underperforming compared to other units, three-quarters of universities intend to increase 
their emphasis on cutting such underperforming units. See 2017 SURVEY OF COLLEGE AND 
UNIVERSITY CHIEF ACADEMIC OFFICERS 35 (Scott Jasckik & Doug Lederman eds 2017).   
 265  Jeremy Paul, Saving the Canary, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 479, 482 (2016); Jay Sterling 
Silver, The Case Against Tamanaha’s Motel 6 Model of Legal Education, 60 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 50, 53 (2012). Many academic units that are part of the university’s core mission 
tend not to generate net tuition sufficient to sustain their operations and are cross-subsidized 
by other academic units. Units such as most professional schools do generate excess funds, 
although dental schools traditionally were net consumers rather than net producers of 
revenues. See William F. Massy, Productivity Issues in Higher Education, in RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 49, 74 (William F. Massy ed., 1996); Frakt, supra note 
43; 1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 39; DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE 
CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 180; WILLIAMS, supra note 242, at 4; Schackner, supra note 
240; HARDIGAN & REED, supra note 127, at 7.  Cf. Sharif Durhams, New Marquette school 
will reshape education in dentistry, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Apr. 29, 2000).   
 266  Brown, supra note 29; Yellen, supra note 29; Gold, supra note 1; Matasar, supra note 
29; Wu, supra note 29; Barnhizer, supra note 29; Leichter, supra note 41; Standard & Poor’s, 
supra note 25, at 1, 9; Campos, supra note 42; Koumpilova, supra note 30; Verges, supra 
note 30.   
 267  See, e.g., Kenneth P. Ruscio, Washington and Lee School of Law Strategic Transition 
Plan, WASH. & LEE UNIV. (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.wlu.edu/presidents-office/messages-to-
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Most paradigmatically in the legal education crisis, the school may find 
itself short of revenues for operational reasons.  For example, the number of 
matriculants may decrease either because the school seems less desirable to 
applicants or because the pool of possible applicants has declined.  Further, 
a decline in applicants will typically lead schools to increase their financial 
aid awards, which reduces the net tuition attributable to the school.268  As the 
dental school crisis illustrated, a private school that competes with a strongly 
supported state school may not be able to lower its net tuition charges to 
attract matriculants admitted to both schools and thus may see its revenues 
decline.269  Less commonly, to the extent a school derives significant 
revenues from gifts, endowment income, or sponsored research, a decline in 
any of those sources could have a deleterious effect on the school. 
A law school’s costs will typically be relatively stable, but they can 
increase in troublesome ways.  For example, schools might see their costs 
increase if they have added or refurbished their physical plant.  Those costs 
of construction are frequently financed such that the school is obligated to 
pay for the construction long after the construction work is completed, and 
regardless of whether the school actually benefits from the new construction. 
In addition, new construction typically means higher maintenance costs, 
which may be difficult to contain.270 
Of course, a school with stable costs is not the same as a school that can 
decrease costs significantly.  A major part of any school’s costs is salaries 
and benefits for faculty and staff.271  Tenured faculty costs cannot 
realistically be cut without significant disruption in the school and danger to 
the program.  As a school’s financial situation erodes, of course, a school 
may have little choice but to incur the fall-out from such reduction.272 
 
 
 
the-community/message-to-the-law-school-community/strategic-transition-plan.   
 268  Leichter, supra note 41; Elizabeth G. Olsen, The Financial Aid Arms Race at Law 
Schools, FORTUNE, Aug. 15, 2013, http://fortune.com/2013/08/15/the-financial-aid-arms-race
-at-law-schools/.  
 269  Manor, supra note 225.  
 270  Standard & Poor’s, supra note 25. (noting the finances of Brooklyn Law School were 
seriously and negatively affected by ownership of student housing buildings); Steven 
Davidoff Solomon, Creditors Keep Troubled Law Schools on Life Support, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
4, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/worth-nothing-failing-law-schools-are-
kept-on-life-support/?_r=0 (noting the finances of Thomas Jefferson School of Law were 
seriously and negatively affected by a new building completed just before the legal education 
crisis).  
 271  University Budgets: Where Your Fees Go, supra note 43; see also Desrochers & 
Kirshstein, supra note 43, at 15 (providing a breakdown of faculty expenditures at 
universities).   
 272  Jones & Smith, supra note 46; cf. Jones supra note 235.   
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For example, Valparaiso’s law school recently offered buyouts to 
twenty-six tenured and long-term contract faculty, and ten accepted, while 
an additional four chose to retire.273  The law school reduced its costs by one-
third, but these actions did not result in particularly positive public relations, 
nor were all the faculty overjoyed with this result.274  Their teaching loads 
increased considerably.275  Reducing untenured faculty has less institutional 
cost, but may still severely affect the school’s operations.276  Valparaiso 
terminated three of its untenured full-time faculty.277  Although reducing 
staff can often be done with less negative publicity and less institutional 
damage,278 the reality is that most schools are not significantly overstaffed.  
Thus the number of staff positions that can be cut without a significant 
impairment of the school’s operation is relatively small.  Further, of course, 
staff members tend to earn relatively modest salaries such that even if a large 
number of staff could be cut, the ultimate financial savings are likely to be 
fairly small. 
2. Attempts to Increase Revenue 
Law schools have naturally attempted to increase their revenues from 
non-JD-tuition sources.  Frequently these approaches are ancillary to the 
school’s core activities.  Some methods that schools use may be successful 
in the sense that they generate revenues in excess of direct costs, but overall, 
they do not generate significant net revenues.  Further, and more 
perniciously, they are likely to distract key law school personnel, especially 
the dean and principal staff members, from other more central tasks. 
As the dental schools discovered, and as all fundraising professionals 
know, law schools cannot fundraise their way to economic viability except 
in rare instances of truly transformative gifts.279  Fundraising can help at the 
 
 273  Marilyn Odendahl, Valparaiso Law School Reduces Faulty, Class Size to Prepare for 
a Different Future, IND. L.., June 29, 2016; Noam Scheiber, An Expensive Law Degree, and 
No Place to Use It, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
06/19/business/dealbook/an-expensive-law-degree-and-no-place-to-use-it.html?_r=0; Dave 
Stafford, Valpo Law Announces Faculty Buyouts, Smaller Future Classes, IND. L., Feb. 26, 
2016.   
 274  Odendahl, supra note 273; Scheiber, supra note 273; Stafford, supra note 273.   
 275  Stafford, supra note 273.   
 276  Lat, supra note 52; Stafford, supra note 273 (noting that three untenured faculty 
members had been given termination notices).   
 277  Odendahl, supra note 273.   
 278  See Paul Caron, UC-Hastings Reduces Incoming Class by 20%, Cuts 27 Staff 
Positions, TAXPROF BLOG (Apr. 27, 2012), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/
2012/04/uc-hastings.html; Odendahl, supra note 273 (noting that seven staff members had 
been terminated); Dave Gram, Vt. law school cutting jobs, preparing for changes, NEWSOK 
(Nov. 25, 2012), http://newsok.com/vt.-law-school-cutting-jobs-preparing-for-changes/
article/feed/466988.   
 279  Hilary Hurt Anyaso, Pritzker family makes unprecedented gift to Northwestern Law, 
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margins, of course, through unrestricted annual fund gifts, and such giving 
helps cement the school’s relationships with its alumni/ae.  It can also help 
with targeted projects, although there is always the danger that the project 
supported is not really important to the school’s overall mission.  At the end 
of the day, such fundraising efforts, even if relatively successful, serve to 
enhance an already viable program, not to rescue or fix a program in trouble. 
Increasing school revenue from collateral academic activities is also 
unlikely to increase a school’s economic health.280  Unlike dental schools, 
most law schools have not fallen for the argument that significant net 
revenues can be generated by continuing education programs.  Rather, for 
most law schools, such programs, when well-run and vibrant, serve partly to 
enhance alumni/ae relations and to provide service to the local bar.281 
Law schools seem more typically to have attempted one of two 
revenue-generating activities: online education and LLM programs.  For 
many schools, online or distance education is a seductive siren song.282  The 
ABA defines distance courses as those that have at least one-third of their 
time components as non-classroom time.  Practically, law students are 
permitted to take (and thus law schools are permitted to offer) up to one 
semester’s worth of distance education to students after the first year.283  At 
least two law schools have received waivers from this limitation and offer a 
JD program with a significant distance education component.284 
 
NORTHWESTERN (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/
2015/10/pritzker-family-makes-unprecedented-gift-to-northwestern-law-.html (noting $100 
million gift to Northwestern University School of Law); Mason Receives $30 Million in Gifts, 
Renames Law School After Justice Antonin Scalia, GEORGE MASON UNIV. NEWS, 
http://www.law.gmu.edu/news/2016/scalia_school_of_law_announcement (last visited Sept. 
27, 2017) (noting $30 million gift to George Mason University Foundation to support the Law 
School); Chris Mondics, Trial lawyer Kline gives $50m to Drexel law school, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (Sept. 19, 2014), http://articles.philly.com/2014-09-19/news/54073725_1_law-
school-kline-school-law-firms (listing transformative gifts to the University of Arizona 
College of Law, Ave Maria School of Law, Chapman University School of Law and Drexel 
University School of Law).   
 280  For a description of the kinds of programs at least some law schools are engaging in, 
see HANOVER RESEARCH, supra note 53 (But note that the listing makes no attempt to assess 
whether these programs generate any (let alone significant) net revenues).   
 281  See Jason Yackee, Comment to Jose Gabilondo, Business model changes at law 
schools, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 20, 2016, 5:38 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2016/03/business-model-changes-at-law-schools.html (indicating a low 
likelihood that CLE programs generate significant net revenue for any but the most elite law 
schools).   
 282  PISTONE & HORN, supra note 61, at X.   
 283  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 262, Standard 306.   
 284  Stephanie Landsman, Digital cracks the final frontier: Law school, CNBC (Apr. 5, 
2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/02/digital-cracks-the-final-frontier-law-school.html; 
Sara Randazzo, Syracuse Law School Exploring Online Degree Program, WALL ST. J. L. 
BLOG (Apr. 20, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/04/20/syracuse-law-school-exploring-
online-degree-program/.   
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At the undergraduate level, distance education has the potential to 
reduce tuition; gross revenues would be increased by having more 
students.285  But neither of the law schools with an online JD program 
provides a tuition discount.286  If distance JD programs proliferate, or if 
individual online law courses become popular, schools would likely be 
forced to discount tuition.  Law students, and others who take those courses, 
would tend to consider such education relatively generic.  As a result, law 
schools providing such courses would find themselves discounting their 
prices.287  This could be problematic for law schools because unlike at the 
undergraduate or even many graduate levels, the substance of online law 
courses would have a much more circumscribed audience.  Therefore, there 
would be a downward limit to the amount by which tuition could be cut, and 
yet schools could still generate the necessary revenue. 
Moreover, distance education as a solution to legal education’s problem 
may be less attractive than appears at first blush.  While distance education 
may, for some institutions, increase revenues, it may also increase costs.288  
Given the seemingly limited potential for legal education courses to increase 
revenue, an increase in costs could be particularly problematic for schools.  
As one knowledgeable higher education individual put it in the context of 
distance education generally, “Have you changed anything other than adding 
technology to the course?  If you do everything exactly the same, and you 
add in the cost of technology, the cost of instructional designers, all you’ve 
done is add cost. . . . The bulk of the cost is people.”289 
The second popular method of increasing net revenues is running LLM 
programs.  LLM and other non-JD degree and certificate programs have 
proliferated and the number of students in such programs has increased 
accordingly.290  In the fall of 2010, the high-water mark for first-year law 
school enrollment and for total JD enrollment, there were 9,773 non-JD 
 
 285  Carl Straumsheim, Bending the Cost Curve, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 27, 2015), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/27/working-paper-suggests-online-
education-can-lower-tuition-costs; David J. Deming et al., Can Online Learning Bend the 
Higher Education Cost Curve?, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 496 (2015), https://ai2-s2-pdfs.
s3.amazonaws.com/628b/6bb11028f643443df8cb24742393ab43259e.pdf.   
 286  Landsman, supra note 284.   
 287  Straumsheim, supra note 285.   
 288  Corinne Ruff, Does Technology Ever Reduce the Costs of Teaching?, CHRON. OF 
HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 26, 2016), http://chronicle.com/article/Does-Technology-Ever-Reduce/
235046.   
 289  Straumsheim, supra note 285.   
 290  E.g., Avi Wolfman-Arent, New paper chase: law school for non-lawyers, 
MARKETPLACE (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.marketplace.org/2016/07/15/education/law-
schools-offering-programs-non-lawyers.  For convenience, I will refer to these programs and 
students as “LLM” programs and students except where I differentiate among programs.   
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students.291  Six years later, first-year law school enrollment had fallen by 
31% and total JD enrollment was down by 25%.  LLM enrollment, however, 
was up by 40% to 13,677.292  The allure of LLM programs was succinctly 
stated: 
[T]he expansion of LLM and other non‐JD offerings appeals to 
law schools because students typically take classes which are 
already offered for JD students, and merely fill what would 
otherwise be empty seats.  In other words, non‐JD students 
typically pose no additional administrative burden for an 
institution.  Additionally, many LLM programs draw in 
international tuition fee rates [i.e., little or no tuition 
discounting]—a fact that only strengthens the case for expanding 
non‐JD offerings.293 
Furthermore, the credentials of LLM students are not generally made 
public and certainly do not factor into a school’s U.S. News ranking so that 
schools can enroll LLM students without regard to possible reputational 
damage.294 
Even more telling than the absolute number is that the proportion of 
LLM students has gone up 75% in only six years.  In 2010, LLM students 
were 6.2% of total law school enrollment and were 11% in 2016.295 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 291  ABA Enrollment, supra note 17.  That number represented an increase of 2,106 (27%) 
from 7,667 in 2006, the most recent low-point for LLM students. Id.   
 292  ABA, 2016 STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT DATA OVERVIEW (2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissio
ns_to_the_bar/statistics/2016_standard_509_data_overview.pdf. (noting first-year 
enrollment in fall 2010 was 52,488 and total JD enrollment was 147,525, and first-year 
enrollment in fall 2016 was 37,107 and total JD enrollment was 110,951); ABA Enrollment, 
supra note 17.   
 293  HANOVER RESEARCH, ALTERNATIVE NON-JD PROGRAMMING FOR LAW SCHOOLS 3 
(2013).   
 294  Adam Scales, Comment to Jose Gabilondo, Business Model Changes at Law Schools, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 20, 2016), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/03/
business-model-changes-at-law-schools.html.   
 295  2016 Standard 509 Information Report Data Overview, supra note 280; ABA 
Enrollment, supra note 17.  I am indebted to Professor Derek T. Muller of Pepperdine for first 
surfacing this change and for preparing vivid and useful graphics.  See, Derek T. Muller, As 
1L class sizes stabilize, one in nine law school enrollees are not a part of a JD program, 
EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY BLOG (Dec. 15, 2016), http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2016/12/
as-1l-class-sizes-stabilize-one-in-nine-law-school-enrollees-are-not-a-part-of-a-jd-program.   
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 But the costs of LLM programs are frequently higher than schools 
realize or admit.296  As with any new program, one-time start-up costs such 
as obtaining ABA acquiescence, are not insignificant.  Once operational, 
student recruiting costs may be higher than for the JD program, especially if 
the school is focusing on attracting international students, who now make up 
roughly half of all LLM students.297  In addition, many programs will 
struggle to attract any, let alone many, students at first.298  Competition for 
LLM students is likely strong, because 85% of law schools offer a non-JD 
program.299 
Finally, depending upon the university’s policies, the law school may 
not be allowed to keep any of the revenues that the LLM program generates.  
Knowledgeable observers suggest that a law school might typically keep 
60% of its gross tuition from LLM programs.300  With so many law schools 
now losing money from their JD programs, an LLM program’s revenues 
might reasonably be entirely allocated to the university to offset, at least in 
part, university subvention of the JD program. 
B. Operational 
As with a law school’s financial situation, a law school’s operational 
choices may affect its board’s decision whether to close the school.301  But 
the dental education crisis suggests that those operational choices are seldom 
determinative.  Thus, schools are likely misguided if they make operational 
choices primarily in an effort to stave off closure or to increase the likelihood 
of the board’s deciding to keep a school going.  An important caveat, though, 
is that those changes might very well be desirable on other grounds, 
principally a belief that the changes are in the best interest of its students.  
 
 296  For critiques of non-JD programs, see Blake Edwards, The Juris Masters Program: 
Natural Evolution or Stop-Gap for Struggling Law Schools?, BLOOMBERG L. BIG L. BUS. 
(Aug. 17, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/the-juris-masters-program-natural-evolution-or-stop-
gap-for-struggling-law-schools/; Derek Muller, The Coming Reckoning for Non-JD Legal 
Education, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY (Nov. 14, 2016), http://excessofdemocracy.com/
blog/2016/11/the-coming-reckoning-for-non-jd-legal-education.   
 297  ABA, Post J.D. Programs by Category, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_
education/resources/llm-degrees_post_j_d_non_j_d/programs_by_category.html (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2017).   
 298  Scales, supra note 294 (suggesting a realistic first class of five).   
 299  ABA-Approved Law Schools, supra note 26 (listing 202 fully accredited law schools); 
ABA, Post-J.D./Non-J.D. Programs by School, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
legal_education/resources/llm-degrees_post_j_d_non_j_d/programs_by_school.html (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2017) (listing 172 schools with post-JD/non-JD programs).   
 300  Scales, supra note 294 (suggesting a realistic first class of 5).   
 301  Of course, depending upon the school and the choice being made, a law school may 
have complete autonomy to make a particular choice, may make the final decision after 
consulting with the university, or may have little or no input on the decision, which will be 
made by the university.   
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The operational choices that perhaps resonate most strongly with the 
university and its board are decisions about admissions, faculty credentials 
(i.e., the hiring, promoting, and tenuring of faculty), faculty research, and 
pedagogy and curriculum. 
Among these operational changes, pedagogy and curriculum seem least 
likely to affect the board’s view of the school, yet many schools seem to 
focus on such areas.  None of the shuttered dental schools were faulted for 
having an inappropriate curriculum or for having an outdated or 
inappropriate focus. 302  Further, among the schools that were publically 
identified as being at risk for closing, none were saved by a cutting-edge 
curriculum or by touting other avant-garde approaches or features. 
1. Admissions 
Just as in the dental education crisis, law schools saw the decline in the 
number of applicants matched by a decline in the quality, using traditional 
measures, of the applicant pool.303  A school in either discipline faced several 
interrelated decisions about admissions: should it keep its pre-crisis 
admissions criteria in place?  If so, then the school needed to decide whether 
to adjust its recruitment efforts, and financial aid policy, to maximize its 
yield (i.e., the percentage of accepted applicants who matriculate).  If it kept 
its criteria and recruitment efforts in place, then for most schools, both the 
number of acceptances would go down and its yield would decline.  If instead 
a school decided to change its admissions criteria, then it needed to decide 
what changes were necessary to achieve what was probably a blend of lower 
enrollment (and its attendant financial implications) and lower traditional 
quality (and its attendant pedagogical and reputational implications).  In that 
case, a school would almost certainly change its recruitment efforts, as well. 
Although these questions were, and are, central to law school 
administrators today, the experience of the dental school crisis suggests that 
those decisions were not likely to affect the board decision whether to close 
the school, although it might be used to justify a decision made principally 
on other grounds.  For example, nearly every dental school saw a decline in 
the number and quality of applicants, but only seven out of sixty were closed.  
Georgetown’s dental school was closed although its admissions were down 
less than 10%.304  Northwestern closed its dental school even though its 
admissions had rebounded by 300%.305 
 
 302  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 45; DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE 
CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 97, 210, 214.   
 303  See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.   
 304  Feinberg, supra note 202 (noting the school had 137 first-year students in the 1986-
1987 year, 8.7% under its target).   
 305  Dunn, supra note 236.   
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Leaving aside the financial component of the admissions decisions, 
which were covered above, boards may, in fact, care about the quality of the 
applicants and matriculants more than the absolute numbers.  The assessment 
that the quality of the school’s applicants is not high enough might be made 
in an absolute sense, but is more likely to be made comparatively.  That is, 
the university believes that the school’s applicants are of lower quality—
either than in the past or in comparison to the applicants in the university’s 
other schools, or both.306  An applicant pool of insufficient quality suggests 
that the matriculants will also have less quality, unless the school changes its 
admissions criteria or recruitment efforts significantly.  Northwestern was 
relatively candid in admitting that the quality of the dental school applicants 
was not on a par with the applicants to its other professional schools and that 
that disparity was a factor in the decision to close the dental school.307 
This lack of quality may be of concern to the university in several 
dimensions.  The university may be concerned that less capable students will 
not be able to take advantage of the school’s opportunities and so the 
students’ education will be shortchanged.  Also, the university may be 
concerned that less capable students will have more difficulty finding jobs, 
which is deleterious both to the students, of course, but also to the institution 
in that placement rates are important in attracting new students and, in the 
professional school context, may affect rankings and institutional prestige.  
On the other hand, keeping student quality high enough to assuage the board 
may result in entering class sizes that are unacceptable to the board, either 
financially or because the school would have too few students to justify the 
school’s physical and staffing (including faculty) capacity. 
2. Faculty Credentials 
A second operational concern is that the law school’s faculty may have 
insufficient stature in terms of their credentials.308  The vast majority of 
faculty in a university hold the Ph.D. or its equivalent, and their entire post-
undergraduate education has essentially been geared toward becoming 
academics.  Law faculty are not produced by a traditional Ph.D. program 
with the intention of producing academics.  The law professoriate typically 
holds the first professional degree in law, the JD.309  Their legal education 
 
 306  Rose, supra note 226; Trustees of Emory University To Eliminate Dental School, supra 
note 180.   
 307  Banchero & Kennedy supra note 235.   
 308  See Jon Sall, Donor Backs Closing School: But NU’s Dental Alumni Fight to Keep 
Institution, CHI. SUN TIMES, Dec. 28, 1997.   
 309  See Philip L. Merkel, Scholar or Practitioner? Rethinking Qualifications for Entry-
Level Tenure-Track Professors at Fourth-Tier Law Schools, 44 CAP. U. L. REV. 507, 508 
(2016).  Some law faculty hold advanced degrees either at the Master’s or Doctorate level in 
other disciplines.  Further, some law faculty have earned the LLM or S.J.D., mostly either 
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was not focused on entering the professoriate at all.  Rather, law faculty are 
essentially byproducts, offal really, from the process of producing practicing 
lawyers.  This distinction in credentials is sometimes keenly marked within 
universities.  It is not uncommon to see internal communications listing, for 
example, university-wide committees that refer to faculty with the Ph.D. as 
“Doctor” while law faculty are “Professor” or even “Mr.” or “Ms.”  Dental 
school faculties are like law faculties in that the vast majority of faculty have 
the first professional degree, the DDS or DMD. The dental faculty at 
Georgetown seemed to feel that their credentials as professionals rather than 
as academics contributed to a perception within the university that the dental 
faculty had less prestigious or appropriate credentials than faculty in other 
parts of the university.310 
3. Research 
Relatedly, a law school’s stature with the board can be decreased if the 
university perceives that the school’s faculty is not engaging in sufficient 
research or research of sufficient rigor.  Dental schools historically fell afoul 
of their universities in this regard and that perceived deficit made a difference 
in the decision to close the schools at Emory, Washington University, and 
Northwestern.311 
At most universities, faculty performance is primarily measured by 
scholarly productivity, which is to say research and published writing.  
Although institutions recognize that teaching is crucial, and many 
institutions claim to value teaching and scholarship equally, the reality is that 
scholarly output rather than teaching ability is the primary measure of faculty 
productivity. 
The research and scholarship that law faculty produce are frequently 
not understood by central university administrators and academics in other 
disciplines and are frequently discounted, as well.  In a nutshell, legal 
scholarship is different from scholarship in other disciplines in that the 
paradigm form is the 20,000- to 40,000-word article rather than either a book 
 
because they are teaching in the area of taxation (and therefore earned an LLM in tax) or 
because their JD was from a less prestigious school and, to be competitive in the hiring market 
for legal academics, they earned an LLM from one of the handful of elite, feeder law schools.   
 310  Feinberg, supra note 201 (quoting dental faculty member who said that dentistry is not 
“a particularly glamorous part of education. I think some people look upon it as a trade school. 
They don’t realize all that we do.”).   
 311  See Gordon, supra note 196 (noting that Emory University decided to focus its 
resources in disciplines undertaking significant research, rather than in dentistry); Mannies, 
supra note 222 (noting that Washington University’s decision made in part because research 
funds had fallen considerably and faculty was undertaking insufficient research); Manor, 
supra note 224; Rose, supra note 216; Sall, supra note 307 (noting that one factor in 
Northwestern’s decision was the university’s perception that the dental faculty did not 
undertake sufficient research). 
CHIAPPINELLI (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2017  11:14 AM 
2017] JUST LIKE PULLING TEETH 49 
or a shorter article.  Articles are selected for publication and edited by 
students with little or no faculty input rather than the peer review process, 
which is the sine qua non in other disciplines.  Further, co-authorship is not 
as common as it is in other disciplines.  Finally, a standard trope in the legal 
profession is to denigrate current legal scholarship as being nearly 
completely irrelevant to judges and the practicing bar.312 
The dental schools faced a similar dynamic.  The faculty’s lack of 
research, or at least of research the university deemed valuable to it, was a 
factor in the closing of the schools at Emory, Washington University and 
Northwestern.313  Dental academics were well aware of their shortcomings 
in research and scholarship.314  Even as late as the early 2000s, one of the 
important impediments to recruiting qualified dental faculty was their lack 
of interest in, or ability to conduct, research.315 
4. Pedagogy and Curriculum 
Finally, as the dental education crisis showed, a law school’s viability 
can be decreased if the university perceives that the school’s pedagogical 
approach is insufficiently rigorous or theoretical.  Dental education’s 
practical, theoretical approach hurt at least some dental schools in their 
relationship with their university, although it was not a factor in schools’ 
closings.316  The final two years of dental school are spent in the dental clinic, 
which was, and often still is, seen as primarily intended to teach physical, 
technician-oriented trade skills rather than intellectually-rooted, but practical 
skills suitable for a profession.317 
 
 312  Orin S. Kerr, The Influence of Immanuel Kant on Evidentiary Approaches in 
Eighteenth Century Bulgaria, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 251 (2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2586464; John Roberts, Address at the 4th Circuit Annual 
Conference, June 25, 2011, http://www.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-
justice-roberts.   
 313  See Gordon, supra note 196 (noting Emory University decided to focus its resources 
in disciplines undertaking significant research, rather than in dentistry); Mannies, supra note 
226 (noting Washington University’s decision made in part because research funds had fallen 
considerably and faculty was undertaking insufficient research); Sall, supra note 308  (one 
factor in Northwestern’s decision was the university’s perception that the dental faculty did 
not undertake sufficient research); Rose, supra note 226.   
 314  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 7–8; RICHARD W. 
VALACHOVIC ET AL., THE VALUE OF THE DENTAL SCHOOL TO THE UNIVERSITY 5–6 (1998).   
 315  N. Karl Haden et. al, Meeting the Demand for Future Dental School Faculty: Trends, 
Challenges, and Responses, 66 J. DENTAL EDUC. 1102, 1106, 1109 (2002).   
 316  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 7 (“[R]esearch builds a 
knowledge base for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of oral health services; 
enriches the educational experience for students; reinforces the school’s role as a disseminator 
of validated practice advice to dental practitioners; and strengthens the stature of dentistry 
within the university and the broader community.”).   
 317  Id. at 8, 12, 100 (stating that there is too much emphasis on lab work that in practice 
is actually done by technicians rather than by dentists). ADEA Comm’n on Change & 
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But, it is clear from the dental schools’ experience that curricular 
change, however desirable, is not essential to survival.318  All dental schools 
had essentially the same curriculum and no significant differences existed 
between the curricula of those schools that closed and those that did not.  
Nonetheless, the perception of dental education pedagogy surely contributed 
to the dental school’s alienation from other academic units and to central 
administrators’ belief that dental education was not as rigorous or academic 
in nature as other disciplines. 
Legal education suffers from some of the same perceptions.  Ironically, 
those within the university and those within the legal profession seem to 
criticize legal education for reasons that are diametrically opposed to each 
other.  Within the university, legal education is often derided as a trade 
school, offering essentially practical skills training rather than the 
intellectually strong, theoretical education that is supposedly the hallmark of 
a traditional university education.  The profession, however, derides legal 
education as three years of ivory tower philosophizing that leaves graduates 
almost completely unprepared to practice law, even with the support of a 
large firm, let alone in sole or small firm practice.319 
C. The Way Forward 
As we learn from the crisis in dental education, schools with 
comparatively solid finances and stable operations were not immune from 
being closed.  Contrarily, schools that ran at a loss and that had somewhat 
haphazard operations often survived.  The lesson is not that finances and 
operations are irrelevant to a school’s survival, it is that those facets are not 
determinative.  More important, in the end, than either finances or a school’s 
current approach to operations is the school’s intentional focus on mission 
and engagement.  Attention to mission and to engagement implicate the 
school’s and the university’s values, standards, and purpose.  These 
qualitative, non-financial, and non-operational aspects can be particularly 
important in institutions such as universities, which, like other nonprofit 
entities, focus on non-economic as well as economic qualities.320  A school’s 
focus on these connections, the skills and attitudes of its dean and faculty, 
and an understanding (note that I do not say embracing) of the importance of 
prestige and rankings in legal education are the ways forward. 
 
Innovation in Dental Educ., The Case for Change in Dental Education, 70 J. DENTAL EDUC. 
921, 922 (2006).   
 318  Kalkwarf et al., supra note 174, at 1085–86; Kassebaum et al., supra note 174, at 915.   
 319  See, e.g., Bourne, supra note 5, at 661, 661 n.36; Segal, supra note 10.  
 320  Debra C. Minkoff & Walter W. Powell, Nonprofit Mission: Constancy, 
Responsiveness, or Deflection?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 591 
(Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006).  
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The overarching lesson of the crisis in dental education is that those 
schools that do not pay appropriate attention to mission and engagement will 
be at much higher risk of closure.  Accordingly, schools must align their 
principal activities, especially their external activities, with the university’s 
perception of its mission and the university’s expectations for the school in 
achieving that mission.  Schools must also deliberately engage with 
constituencies outside the school itself, including, critically, others within 
the university.  Equally vital, to engage effectively and align the school’s 
actions with the university, a school needs a dean with a particular sort of 
mind-set and a faculty attitude conducive to moving forward.  Finally, a 
school’s dean and faculty must consider the importance of prestige and 
rankings to its ability to achieve its goals.  I discuss prestige and rankings in 
the next section and the other processes here. 
1. Align with the University’s Mission 
Schools should ensure that their actions are aligned with the 
university’s mission. They should also try to address their actions to the 
needs of the relevant professional and lay communities.  This is essentially 
a question of strategy.  While nearly all higher education institutions strive 
to educate their students well, to increase knowledge through research, and 
to generate sufficient revenue to continue or expand those functions, they 
vary tremendously in the emphasis they put on each function and in their 
definition of those functions. 
For example, one institution could decide that the best way to educate 
students well is to admit students with the highest traditional credentials that 
it can attract and to gear the teaching toward providing as sophisticated and 
advanced a classroom experience as possible.  At the same time, another 
institution could decide that the best way to educate students well is to admit 
students with extremely modest credentials and to focus its teaching toward 
providing as much value-added as possible.  Both approaches are valid.  
However, a school that is focused on one approach yet situated in a university 
that is focused on the other is likely to be perceived by the university as less 
valuable to the university than other units more aligned with the university’s 
mission and goals.  More concretely, 90% of provosts said they planned to 
increase their emphasis on funding academic programs based on whether the 
program aligned with the university’s mission.321 
In the same way, for some universities, service to the geographically 
local communities is an important part of its mission.  At those institutions, 
a school that emphasizes local service, usually via clinical services, can align 
 
 321  2017 SURVEY OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY CHIEF ACADEMIC OFFICERS, supra note 
264, at 31.   
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itself with the university’s mission and consolidate much goodwill in the 
school’s location.  However, even if the university does not focus on its own 
community, a school can increase its viability by providing concrete service 
to the local community.  Northwestern was explicit that a major reason for 
closing its dental school was the school’s failure to align its mission with that 
of the university.322  Likewise, the Chancellor at the University of Pittsburgh, 
which considered closing its dental school, noted that a primary criterion 
would be whether the school was “central to the University’s mission. . . .”323 
2. Engage Outside the School 
A related lesson schools should learn is that schools should engage with 
their university and their relevant professional and lay communities.  Schools 
should work to garner political support for the school from within their 
university.  Dental schools were frequently seen to be relatively isolated from 
other schools and also from the relevant practice communities.324  At least 
one source suggests a connection between this isolation and the decisions to 
close the schools.325  As early as 1983, some dental educators realized that 
schools would need to be actively seeking political support within their 
institutions if they were to continue in existence.326 
One of the most vital constituencies with which to connect, the 
importance of which is generally underappreciated by those who are not 
deans, are other administrators within the university.  The provost, president, 
chief financial officer, and chief advancement officer are naturally key 
players in the school’s success.  The deans of other academic units are also 
key to a school’s success, because they too can be “evangelists” for the 
school (after their own school, of course). 
3. Clinics as an Example of Alignment with Mission and 
Engagement 
The dental schools’ clinics can be an instructive lesson for law schools 
in terms of the importance both of alignment with the university’s mission 
and of engagement.  Engagement, the sense of a school’s service, usually 
means a school’s faculty resources are expended to assist people or entities 
outside the university, typically (but not necessarily) those located near the 
university.  The amount, kind, quality, economic cost, and perceived benefits 
to the university of a school’s service efforts are certainly assessed by the 
board and senior university leadership.  Agricultural extension activities are 
 
 322  Stephanie Banchero, NU May Close Its Dental School, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1997.   
 323  Schackner, supra note 240.   
 324  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 122–23.   
 325  2001 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 89–90.   
 326  1983 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 41. 
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one example of this kind of activity.  Many professional schools, including 
law schools and dental schools, operate low-cost or free clinics for local 
residents.327 
Clinics are an important part of dental education.  Half of a student’s 
dental education, the final two years, is spent primarily in clinical settings.328  
The average dental school clinic handles tens of thousands of patient visits 
annually.329  Some schools average even more.  For example, the clinic at 
Georgetown’s dental school had over 200,000 patient visits per year.330  
Typically, the patients at a dental school clinic are low income people from 
the community in which the university is located.331  Although many people 
with above-the-median wealth and income are unaware of this, having good 
teeth is an extraordinarily important aspect of a person’s ability to get and 
hold a job and to be upwardly mobile in contemporary American society.332  
An active dental school clinic is a nearly paradigmatic example of a 
professional school, and hence a university, engaging with an external 
community. 
And yet, the experience of dental clinics during the dental education 
crisis vividly shows the perils of engagement without alignment with the 
university’s mission.  Both Georgetown and Washington University had 
very active dental clinics located near the main university.  But when the 
board of each university closed the dental school, the fact that the school had 
a deep and strong engagement with the local community was unavailing.  In 
the end, the board cared about the university’s (and hence each school’s) 
national academic reputation.  Although each board doubtlessly was pleased 
at the dental school’s engagement with the local community, the school’s 
resources were not being used in alignment with the university’s mission and 
so that engagement could not forestall the school’s closing. 
Clinical education in dentistry is perhaps the most expensive education 
in a university.333  The dental school must pay for the entire physical plant 
of its clinic, unlike in medicine where those costs are cross-subsidized by the 
 
 327  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 262, Standard 303(b) (discussing that law schools should 
provide pro bono and clinic opportunities).   
 328  AM. DENTAL ASS’N, DENTAL SCHOOL CURRICULUM (2015).   
 329  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 180; Allan J. Formicola et 
al., Evolution of Dental School Clinics as Patient Care Delivery Centers, 70 J. DENTAL EDUC. 
1271, 1279 (2006), http://www.jdentaled.org/content/70/12/1271.full.pdf+html (Columbia 
University’s dental school averages over 30K patient visits per year).  
 330  Feinberg, supra note 202. 
 331  FINANCING DENTAL EDUCATION, supra note 92, at 15. 
 332  Sarah Smarsh, Poor Teeth, AEON (Oct. 23, 2014), https://aeon.co/essays/there-is-no-
shame-worse-than-poor-teeth-in-a-rich-world.   
 333  2001 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 90–91.   
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hospitals in which the medical students train.334  Although dental clinics 
typically charge fees for their services and accept government health 
program payments, clinic operating expenses exceed clinic revenue by as 
much as 300%.335 
Legal clinics are much less expensive to run than dental clinics, of 
course, because there are no large physical plant expenses.  From a strictly 
financial angle, legal clinics should be more palatable to university boards 
than dental clinics.  However, compared to so-called doctrinal courses, 
clinical legal education is significantly more expensive.336  Thus, at least 
within the law school budget process, clinical courses are problematic.337  
Operationally, law school clinics can engage with many fewer clients than 
dental schools’ clinics do.  In terms of value to the university, then, legal 
clinics directly affect fewer community members than dental or medical 
schools do, but nevertheless can engage meaningfully. 
However, legal clinics are probably more vulnerable to misalignment 
with the university’s mission than are dental clinics.  Legal clinics are subject 
to the same misalignment in the sense experienced by Georgetown or 
Washington University (i.e., the school engaged with a local community 
while the university valued engagement on a national scale).  Moreover, 
unlike dentistry (or medicine) in which the provision of services to the 
community is universally considered a social good, law clinics, with 
surprising frequency, undertake projects that alienate constituencies that are 
important to the university.  For example, clinics at LSU and the University 
of Maryland law schools took actions that offended powerful interests within 
the state.  While each university may have rightly believed that, on the whole, 
its legal clinic was providing service to its community, other constituencies 
clearly disagreed.338 
4. The Dean and Faculty 
Perhaps the most important quality a school can possess that will 
increase its viability is a dean who recognizes the importance of being able 
to articulate the school’s purpose, how the school benefits the university, the 
school’s recent successes and current challenges, and the school’s plan 
(spearheaded by the dean but jointly crafted by the dean and faculty) for 
 
 334  Id.   
 335  FINANCING DENTAL EDUCATION, supra note 92, at 14; Formicola et al., supra note 329; 
Walker et al., supra note 109.   
 336  Robert R. Kuehn, Pricing Clinical Legal Education, 92 DENVER U.L. REV. 1, 19–25 
(2014). 
 337  Id.   
 338  Nelson supra note 260; Urbina, supra note 260.   
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building on those successes and meeting those challenges.339  In that 
connection, the dean is the lynchpin to ensure that the school’s plans both 
embrace the school’s own distinctiveness, effect the faculty’s vision for 
progress, and align with the university’s mission and the university’s own 
plans for the school. 
The dean needs to be able to engage with, and work well with, his or 
her faculty, of course, but also with external constituencies, such as alumni/
ae, practitioners in the school’s locale, deans at other law schools, and 
accreditors.  As noted, one of the most underrated skills a dean can possess 
is the ability to engage with the deans within the university, the university’s 
provost, CFO, president, and board.340  In most such interactions, the dean is 
the public face of the law school.  Many external constituents will essentially 
equate the school with the dean’s persona; the dean, in important ways, 
embodies the school.341 
In the dental school crisis, one widespread impediment to moving 
forward was the dean’s and the faculty’s narrowness of knowledge and 
experience with other models of higher education and professional 
education.342  The lesson for legal education is to seek out deans who have 
an appreciation, whether gained from study or experience, of other 
professions and of higher education generally.  A second lesson is that a dean 
needs to have a capacity for strategic thought.  In any academic field, when 
resources are plentiful for a school, a dean can be “successful” in the sense 
of remaining in place, by simply bestowing resources on as many faculty as 
possible.  In the current crisis, and, in truth, at any time, schools will be more 
successful when the dean has the strategic vision to align resources with the 
school’s (and university’s) mission.  As we saw with clinics at the dental 
schools at Georgetown and elsewhere, a major investment of resources in 
activities that are not aligned with what is (one hopes) a vision for the school 
shared by the school and university, is likely to hurt the school when a crisis 
develops.  Finally, as noted above, a crisis such as the one in legal education 
can result in higher turnover of deans.  Even a fabulous dean will take time, 
at least an academic year, to get up to speed on the school and to start to 
move the school forward. 
 
 
 
 
 339  See Donald J. Polden, Leading Institutional Change: Law Schools and Legal 
Education in a Time of Crisis, 83 TENN. L. REV. 949,977 (2016); DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE 
CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 222; WILLIAMS, supra note 242, at 6–8.   
 340  See WILLIAMS, supra note 242, at 6–8.   
 341  Cf. DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 222   
 342  WILLIAMS, supra note 242, at 5.   
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A crucial role for the dean is to show the university that the school’s 
activities are consonant with the university’s goals and that the school is 
adding value to the university in important ways.343  That is, it is not enough 
for a school to be aligned with the university’s mission and to be engaged 
with important external constituencies if the university’s central 
administrators are unaware of those facts.  For example, as noted above, law 
faculty credentials and research are areas in which universities are often 
critical of legal education.  A dean can have a strong positive effect on the 
university by demonstrating the appropriateness of law faculty credentials, 
even though they are different from other disciplines.344  Those faculty 
members, who teach in the law clinic and the legal research and writing 
program, not only have the JD, but nearly always have practice experience 
in the areas in which they teach. 
Quite importantly, a law faculty’s contingent faculty (i.e., its adjuncts) 
teach only part-time while practicing in the area in which they are teaching.  
In the university generally, contingent faculty have advanced, and frequently 
have terminal, degrees in their discipline but are not permanent faculty 
members.  Thus, contingent faculty in other fields bring less in the way of 
distinctive education than law contingent faculty do.345  For example, many 
law school adjuncts have comprehensive practical substantive knowledge of 
the course they are teaching, which may far surpass the knowledge that a 
tenure-track faculty member might have in that area.  That sort of expertise 
is usually lacking in contingent faculty in other fields.  Law school adjuncts 
can also give students more current and useful practice-skill instruction than 
doctrinal tenure-track faculty can.  Finally, law school contingent faculty can 
provide valuable employment networking opportunities.346  These 
advantages make law school adjuncts more valuable to legal education than 
adjuncts in other fields.  Likewise, the dean can show how legal scholarship 
is both theoretical and practical.  Legal scholarship both creates knowledge 
and disseminates it.  Further, it pushes for progress in ways that scholarship 
in other disciplines seldom can.347 
 
 343  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 222.   
 344  Cf. dental education, in which both the basic science and clinical faculty tend to hold 
the D.D.S. ADEA, Dental School Faculty by Primary Appointment, Percentage of All 
Faculty, 2012-2013 Academic Year (2012-2013); ADEA, Number of Faculty Positions by 
Appointment, 2012-2013 Academic Year (2012-2013).   
 345  Cf. dental education, in which many of the basic science and clinical faculty are, or 
have been, practicing dentists. VALACHOVIC ET AL., supra note 314, at 5-6.   
 346  See David Lander, Motivations For Law Schools To Use Adjuncts to Fill Gaps in the 
Curriculum or to Reduce Expenses, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 14, 2016), http://prawfsblawg.
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/12/motivations-for-law-schools-to-use-adjuncts-to-fill-gaps-
in-the-curriculum-or-to-reduce-expenses.html.   
 347  See Robin West & Danielle Citron, On Legal Scholarship, ASS’N OF AM. L. SCHS. 
(2014), http://www.aals.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/OnLegalScholarship-West-Citron.
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Similarly, the dean should be the principal advocate with the university 
in support of legal education’s pedagogy.  A law school can distinguish itself 
from other units, and thereby add value to the university, through its 
educational approach.  One way in which law schools can do so is to 
emphasize the experiential basis of their pedagogy.348  Law schools are well 
placed to emphasize this aspect of their pedagogy.  The ABA requires law 
schools to establish learning outcomes that include competency in such 
professional skills frequently taught through experiential education 
including: “interviewing, counseling, negotiation, fact development and 
analysis, trial practice, document drafting, conflict resolution, organization 
and management of legal work, collaboration, cultural competency, and self-
evaluation.”349  Currently, law schools must require every law student to take 
at least six credit hours of experiential courses, defined as a simulation 
course, a clinic, or a field placement (i.e., externship).350  Note as well that 
the ABA is concerned with the possibility that, in legal education, skills 
training frequently lacks the requisite normative, theoretical basis that is 
necessary to keep skills training from becoming wholly technician-oriented.  
The ABA Standards explicitly require that skills training include theory and 
doctrine.351  In that aspect, legal education seems to be avoiding a pitfall that 
dental education did not. 
The dean must marshal resources (financial and otherwise) needed to 
implement the school’s plans.352  The dean and faculty together set the 
agenda for continual improvement and modernization within the school.  
And the faculty’s collective attitude toward the institution is crucial to the 
school’s vibrancy.  At certain schools during the dental education crisis, 
faculty resistance to change and the faculty’s isolation from other scholars 
impeded the school’s relationship with the university and made those schools 
more likely to be closed.353  But note that it was the dental faculty’s morale 
and attitude that was being criticized, not faculty shared governance or the 
faculty’s passion about the school.  Faculty who were in what one 
commenter called a “weakened condition” (by which he meant a disengaged, 
cynical, fatalistic faculty) were unhelpful to the school.354  That lack of 
faculty morale and the faculty cynicism were directly responsible, in at least 
one instance, for loss of board support for the school, which was eventually 
 
pdf; Cass R. Sunstein, In Praise of Law Books and Law Reviews (And Jargon-Filled Academic 
Writing), 114 MICH. L. REV. 833 (2016).   
 348  Cf. VALACHOVIC ET AL., supra note 314, at 5–6.   
 349  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 262, Standard 302(d); id. INTERPRETATION 302-1.   
 350  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 262, Standard 303(a)(3).   
 351  Id. at 303(a)(3)(i).   
 352  Id.   
 353  DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 100, 122, 203.   
 354  WILLIAMS, supra note 242, at 7.   
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closed.355 
Some law schools have stabilized financially, in the sense that their 
admissions quantity and quality seem likely to remain relatively predictable, 
the faculty has been reduced in size, and other costs seem under control.  
Others are still moving toward stabilization.  But every law school will be 
faced with making critical decisions about what can be described as strategic 
spending, that is, spending on the law school that is in some sense 
discretionary or programmatic.  This kind of spending is in distinction to 
ongoing law school budgeting decisions for admissions/financial aid, career 
services, and other aspects of the school’s operations.  Every school will 
eventually have the opportunity to add faculty members,356 and each year, in 
reality, every distinctive academic initiative at the school is subject to 
reassessment. 
These strategic decisions involve two areas: faculty hiring and 
academic programming emphasis.  In a law school with rising economics, 
deans could facilitate faculty hiring and could allocate money for academic 
projects that were largely sui generis and largely disconnected from the 
university’s or law school’s mission.  Still, even in that luxurious 
environment, schools at which the dean and faculty made thoughtful faculty 
hires, related not only to curricular needs but to school mission, and deans 
who allocated resources for academic ventures that aligned the school with 
the university and outside communities, found themselves in better 
comparative situations than those schools that took a more ad hoc, let 1,000 
flowers bloom, approach. 
Now, in the new normal, it is even more important for schools to make 
critical decisions in those two areas with a sense of strategy.  To do that, the 
dean must know, and one hopes help shape, the university’s view of the law 
school and the university’s expectations for how the law school’s efforts fit 
with the university’s mission.  That knowledge, and the faculty’s 
understanding and support of that vision, will allow schools to make strategic 
hiring and academic program decisions that will quickly inure to the school’s 
benefit. 
Schools with a dean and faculty that can accomplish these tasks will 
find that the school’s position with the university is more secure, there are 
more synergy gains among the faculty and among the programs within the 
law school, and that all law school constituencies have a greater sense of 
purpose and institutional satisfaction.  Schools that fail to accomplish these 
 
 355  Id.   
 356  The classic example is a school that loses its only tax professor.  While surely the basic 
income tax course could be covered well enough by a non-tax professor (or an adjunct), core 
advanced courses such as partnership tax, can really only be taught adequately by a faculty 
member who specializes in tax.   
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tasks will find that, in the end, they have let 1,000 flowers wilt. 
D. Of Prestige and Rankings 
One lesson, a central lesson, for law schools involves a dynamic that 
was largely unaddressed in the dental education crisis.  That dynamic is the 
school’s prestige.  At the time of the dental school crisis, prestige was not a 
factor that concerned most schools.357  Most schools received relatively 
modest research grants and, therefore, did little research, which is the 
primary basis for prestige in the sciences.358  That is not to say that questions 
of prestige did not affect the dental schools.  They did.  A perceived lack of 
prestige at the dental school, either absolutely or in relation to the university, 
was cited as a reason for closing the dental school at Emory, Georgetown, 
Washington University, and Northwestern.359 
Rankings, however, did not affect dental school closings because there 
were no rankings.360  Because rankings and, to some extent prestige, were 
not endogenous to the dental school crisis, I treat them here separately.  The 
importance of having prestige and high rankings is a clear lesson for law 
schools, but one that is gleaned from dental schools by their absence rather 
than by the way in which dental schools dealt with prestige and rankings.  By 
contrast, of course, legal education values prestige as expressed by faculty 
scholarship and ranking in U.S. News.361 
Universities in general seek to have prestigious programs, especially in 
the professional schools.  For example, several universities have sought to 
increase their prestige by opening medical schools in recent years.362  One 
lament from the dean of Harvard’s dental school is that the dental schools 
that have opened since the crisis have not been located at prestigious 
(measured by AAU membership) universities.  This suggests that, still today, 
universities do not view a dental school as adding to the university’s 
 
 357  Cf. DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 202–03 (noting that 
the decline in number and quality of applicants might affect university prestige). The 370-
page report used the word “prestige” twice. Id.   
 358  Id. at 150, 159 & n.5.   
 359  Haden et al., supra note 314, at 1109 (admonishing dental schools to increase their 
universities’ prestige); Lau, supra note 236 (noting the most significant factor was declining 
admissions); Sall, supra note 295. 
 360  Truman supra note 240 (re no DDS rankings). Intriguingly, or perhaps ironically, one 
source reports that the deans of the dental schools agreed to collectively boycott U.S. News’ 
attempt to rank dental schools in the late 1990s and that their efforts successfully thwarted 
U.S. News’ plans. WENDY NELSON ESPELAND & MICHAEL SAUDER, ENGINES OF ANXIETY: 
ACADEMIC RANKINGS, REPUTATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 190–91 (2016).   
 361  Olufunmilayo B. Arewa et al., Enduring Hierarchies in American Legal Education, 
89 IND. L.J. 941 (2014); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 417, 
420 (2012).   
 362  Kiley, supra note 64.   
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prestige.363 
“Prestige” in most university settings usually means grants, measured 
by the total dollars awarded to university researchers.364  Legal education, by 
that traditional measure, actually is a special snowflake.  Rather than grant 
money, prestige in legal education is measured by the annual spring ranking 
in U.S. News & World Report.365  The U.S. News rankings are vital to law 
schools, as is prestige.366  This is true even though there is a widespread belief 
that the rankings are not accurate or helpful to law schools or legal education 
more broadly.367  Even if a school itself believes that the rankings are 
inaccurate and unhelpful, important external constituencies, principally 
prospective students, prospective faculty, prospective employers, and 
alumni/ae view the rankings as important when making decisions about the 
school.368  Many operational decisions that law schools make are made in the 
shadow of those decisions’ effect on the school’s U.S. News ranking.369  For 
example, schools change their marketing approaches in light of rankings.370  
Schools also consider U.S. News in almost every facet of their operations 
including strategic planning, admissions and financial aid, career services, 
faculty recruiting, and programmatic choices.371  More concretely, a change 
in U.S. News’ methodology that discounted law school-funded jobs for 
graduates resulted in a dramatic decline in those types of jobs.372 
 
 363  2001 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 90; R. Bruce Donoff, It Is Time for a 
New Gies Report, 70 J. DENTAL EDUC. 809, 817 (2006).   
 364  AAU Membership Policy, ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS., https://www.aau.edu/who-we-
are/membership-policy (last visited Sept. 27, 2017); see also, HARDIGAN & REED, supra note 
127, at 8, 11.   
 365  MICHAEL SAUDER & WENDY ESPELAND, FEAR OF FALLING: THE EFFECTS OF U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REPORT RANKINGS ON U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 5 (2007); Arewa et al., supra note 368, 
at 944; Michael Sauder, Interlopers and Field Change: The Entry of U.S. News into the Field 
of Legal Education, 53 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 109 (2008).  Although U.S. News rankings are only a 
generation or so old, a definite hierarchy of law schools has been in place from early in the 
twentieth century.  See Arewa et al., supra note 368, at 942.   
 366  SAUDER & ESPELAND, supra note 365, at 5 (“[g]iven the hyperimportance of status in 
the legal field”).   
 367  Arewa et al., supra note 368, at 942, 1005.   
 368  MICHAEL SAUDER & WENDY ESPELAND, FEAR OF FALLING: THE EFFECTS OF U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REPORT RANKINGS ON U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 2 (2007); Henderson & Zahorsky, supra 
note 5.   
 369  SAUDER & ESPELAND, supra note 365, at 2; Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do 
Rankings Matter? The Effect of U.S. News & World Report Rankings on the Admissions 
Process of Law Schools, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 105 (2006).   
 370  SAUDER & ESPELAND, supra note 365, at 1.   
 371  Id. at 27.   
 372  Paul Caron, After U.S. News Stopped Giving Full Weight to Law School-Funded Jobs, 
52% of Those Jobs Disappeared, TAXPROF BLOG (May 3, 2016), http://taxprof.typepad.com/
taxprof_blog/2016/05/after-us-news-stopped-giving-full-weight-to-law-school-funded-jobs-
52-of-those-jobs-disappeared.html.   
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Aligning a school’s values, including the degree to which it pursues 
prestige, with that of the university is one aspect of U.S. News’s effect.  
Another, though, is that a school’s costs are likely to increase if it falls in 
U.S. News.  Further, such a school may find that its faculty and staff may 
become less productive because they become increasingly demoralized if the 
school falls in the rankings.373  Schools that fall in the rankings are likely to 
find that their yield (i.e., the percentage of accepted students who 
matriculate) worsens.  That possibility tends to lead to schools lowering their 
net tuition revenue by increasing their financial aid awards in an effort to 
keep their yield up.374  Not every law school will be identically affected, of 
course, and those at the top of the rankings hierarchy may not be affected 
much at all.375 
Further, it seems likely that the cost to the university and law school of 
increased law school prestige is likely less than increasing the prestige in 
some other units, notably in the STEM fields or healthcare.  In those other 
settings, attracting grants may require significant faculty recruitment costs 
and physical plant enhancements, the costs of which are only partially offset 
by the grant money received.  In law schools, prestige is more a function of 
re-allocating resources rather than necessarily adding resources exclusively 
dedicated to prestige-enhancement.  Moreover, law school prestige, because 
it is not grant-based, can act as a distinctive measure of university prestige, 
rather than contributing by being yet another grant-based prestige system.  
All of these qualities doubtlessly make a higher ranked law school more 
viable than a lower ranked one.  At bottom, a major component of U.S. 
News’s rankings is peer evaluation, which, in turn, is correlated with faculty 
scholarship.376  More broadly, law school prestige beyond U.S. News’s 
rankings is a function of faculty scholarship.377 
Prestige is a game worth winning, but at least for some schools, it may 
not be a game worth playing.  It is worth winning in that schools with 
relatively more prestige attract better (by traditional measures) students and 
garner higher net tuition (net of financial aid).  Such school’s students have 
more employment options.  The school’s university also benefits in the 
reflected glory of increased prestige of one of its academic units. 
 
 
 373  SAUDER & ESPELAND, supra note 365, at 1, 127–28.   
 374  Id. at 2, 76–79; James Monks & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, The Impact of U.S. News & 
World Report College Rankings on Admissions Outcomes and Pricing Policies at Selective 
Private Institutions (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7227, 1999); cf. 
Sauder & Lancaster, supra note 369; see also Arewa et al., supra note 368, at 944.   
 375  Barnhizer, supra note 54.   
 376  SAUDER & ESPELAND, supra note 365, at 218 (noting peer reputation counts for 25% 
of overall ranking, the highest single input).   
 377  Tamanaha, supra note 361, at 420.   
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But at least some law schools may choose not to compete for higher 
rankings.  There may be a variety of reasons for this.  One may be an 
institutional belief that the ranking inputs are inappropriate measures of law 
school quality.  Relatedly, a school might believe that its mission requires 
that the school devote resources in ways that do not maximize its ranking.  
One intriguing recent suggestion is that schools that focus on rankings will 
be less able to compete in the future because they will be oblivious to the 
coming disruption in the provision of legal education.378 
Schools that have low rankings379 or that do not compete for prestige 
must bear in mind two costs.  First, axiomatic from the benefits of increased 
prestige, it will likely be more expensive to operate a school with less 
prestige.  Its net tuition per student will likely be lower than a school with 
more prestige because it will have to award more financial aid to attract 
sufficient students.  Further, other costs associated with admissions and 
student retention may increase, as well.  The school’s yield is likely to be 
lower than a comparable, but higher-ranked, school so it will have to expend 
more resources to expand the pool of suitable applicants to generate enough 
accepted students to yield an appropriate entering class. 
Second, schools that have a low ranking or that do not compete for 
prestige should take a hard look at the dental schools’ crisis.  Because of the 
lack of a ranking system or, indeed, any widespread measure of relative 
prestige among dental schools, the schools were unable to distinguish 
themselves to prospective students.  Unlike law, 80% or more of dental 
school graduates enter solo practice (often in space-sharing arrangements 
with one or two other dentists).380  Thus, unlike law, lack of prestige did not 
harm dental schools in terms of graduate employment. 
However, in admissions, the lack of prestige certainly hobbled dental 
schools.381  The admissions consequence of lack of prestige among schools 
was that prospective students matriculated based on net tuition and on the 
convenience of the school’s location.382  For schools in sparsely populated 
areas, recruitment could be challenging.  And for private schools, especially, 
competing on net tuition with better-subsidized public schools was difficult 
or impossible.  As we saw, inability to compete for students with lower-
priced public schools was a factor in the decisions to close Emory, 
Northwestern, and especially Washington University.383 
 
 378  PISTONE & HORN, supra note 61, at 2.   
 379  Most pointedly, schools listed in U.S. News’s bottom quartile, which it calls “second 
tier” and touts as “other schools to consider.”   
 380  2001 FUTURE OF DENTISTRY, supra note 82, at 42.   
 381  Lau, supra note 237.   
 382  Id.   
 383  Id.   
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Most law schools, public and private, charge relatively similar tuition 
at comparable rankings levels, so private schools are capable of competing 
against public schools on tuition, as a general principle.  As, perhaps most 
famously, Michael Porter pointed out, competition on price is extremely 
difficult to sustain because competitors can easily match the lowered price.384  
A school with a low ranking may have more trouble attracting sufficient 
matriculants without serious net tuition cuts, especially if the school is 
located either in an area with low college-age population (because people are 
unlikely to move to the area to attend a law school with low rank unless the 
net tuition is distinctly less than at comparable schools nearer to home) or in 
areas with other law schools where the number of law school seats per capita 
in the area is relatively high.  As dental schools learned, without school 
prestige to bring to the university, a school may be hard pressed to point to 
other university benefits from continuing the school. 
In any event, law schools should understand that they need to make the 
case to their university that they can bring prestige to the institution.  They 
also need to ensure that the university understands that law school prestige 
is differently measured than in other disciplines and that the costs and 
benefits are manifested in different ways.385 
E. Observations from Closed Law Schools 
Two universities to date, Hamline University and Whittier College,386 
have announced the closing of their law schools.387  Of course, perfect 
transparency in either case is impossible to come by, so analysis of these 
closings needs to rely on inferences from publicly available information.  
 
 384  MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING 
INDUSTRY AND COMPETITORS 17 (1980).   
 385  VALACHOVIC ET AL., supra note 314, at 5–7.   
 386  The formal name of the institution is Whittier College, although I refer to it as a 
university for simplicity.   
 387  InfiLaw closed Charlotte School of Law, one of its three for-profit law schools. See 
Press Release, Charlotte School of Law, Charlotte School of Law Statement regarding 
Closure (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/
files/Press%20Release_Closure.pdf.  In addition, another of InfiLaw’s schools, Arizona 
Summit Law School, is currently on ABA probation.  Council of Section of L. Educ., ABA, 
Notice of Probation and Specific Remedial Action Arizona Summit Law School (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissi
ons_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/March2017CouncilOpenSessionMaterials/
2017_march_arizona_summit_probation_remedial_action_notice.authcheckdam.pdf.  In 
addition, Thomas M. Cooley School of Law closed one of its five campuses at the end of 2014 
but the other campuses remained in operation.  See supra note 34.  Finally, in October 2016 
Indiana Tech University announced the closing of its law school. However, that law school 
never received full accreditation from the ABA and in fact had been provisionally accredited 
only seven months before the closure decision was made. Indiana Tech’s law school was in 
operation for only four academic years.  See supra note 35. 
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Nonetheless, both closings are consistent with my claims that the schools 
most in danger of being closed are not those that simply have deteriorating 
financial metrics.  Rather, factors such as the university’s own financial 
position, a university perception that law school quality is too low compared 
to other academic units, a school’s lack of mission fit with the university, 
and the availability of a solution that seems likely to generate minimal 
negative public opinion for the university and little dislocation for law school 
faculty, staff, and students play a larger role in the decision to close a school. 
Like many other law schools, both Hamline and Whittier had declining 
first-year enrollment. Hamline’s entering class declined by over 60% 
between the fall of 2011 and 2014.388  Its 2014 entering class was among the 
smallest in the country.389  Whittier’s entering class declined by over 50% 
between the fall of 2011 and 2016.390  Hamline’s LSAT scores remained 
essentially constant though its median financial aid award increased, 
suggesting that Hamline chose to maintain the quality of its entering classes, 
by traditional measures, while sacrificing tuition revenues.391  It seems likely 
that Hamline’s tuition revenue, net of financial aid, fell perhaps by half 
between 2011 and 2014.392  At Whittier, however, unlike at Hamline, LSAT 
scores declined precipitously and its median financial aid award doubled.393  
This suggests that Whittier’s tuition revenues declined considerably and that 
the student quality, by traditional measures, fell, as well.  Still, as noted 
above, many law schools have run—and probably are currently running—
with significantly reduced net tuition revenues, and the LSAT scores of 
 
 388  The merger of Hamline and William Mitchell was announced in February 2015.  
Maura Lerner, Hamline, William Mitchell law schools to merge, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 13, 2015), 
http://www.startribune.com/printarticle/?id=291856891. 
 389  In the fall of 2014, Hamline was in the bottom 12% of all law schools for number of 
entering students. Adam Wahlberg, Why William Mitchell and Hamline Law had to merge, 
MINNPOST, Feb. 18, 2015, https://www.minnpost.com/education/2015/02/why-william-
mitchell-and-hamline-law-had-merge.   
 390  ABA, Whittier Law School 2011 Standard 509 Information Report; 
http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org/; ABA, Whittier Law School 2016 Standard 509 
Information Report, http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org/. The fall 2016 statistics are 
relevant because Whittier College announced the closure of its law school in the Spring of 
2017.   
 391  ABA, Hamline University School of Law 2011 Standard 509 Information Report, 
http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org/; ABA, Hamline University School of Law 2015 
Standard 509 Information Report, http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org/.  
 392  Cf. Hamline University School of Law 2011 Standard 509 Information Report, supra 
note 391; ABA, Hamline University School of Law 2014 Standard 509 Information Report, 
http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org/; ABA, Hamline University School of Law 2015 
Standard 509 Information Report, http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org/.  
 393  Whittier Law School 2011 Standard 509 Information Report, supra note 390; Whittier 
Law School 2016 Standard 509 Information Report, supra note 390. Whittier’s 
75th/50th/25th percentile LSAT scores declined from 154/152/149 in 2011 to 149/146/144 in 
2016.  Its median financial aid award for full time students went from $9,000 to $18,000.   
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matriculants have declined nationwide.394 
Hamline had been rumored for years to be in talks with William 
Mitchell before an agreement was reached in February 2015.395  Serious 
discussions began as the fall 2014 semester began.396  More than a year 
before that, however, Hamline had taken steps to lower its costs by reducing 
its faculty size.  Between the fall of 2011 and the fall of 2014, Hamline 
reduced its full-time faculty by roughly half, in part by offering early 
retirement buy-outs.397  In terms of the law school’s operational and financial 
importance to the university, law students accounted for less than 10% of the 
university’s total student body and net law school tuition was just over 10% 
of the university’s total net tuition.398  In terms of a presence on campus and 
a financial impact on the university as a whole, a decline in the number of 
law students and a significant decline in the law school’s net revenues need 
not have had a major effect on the university’s health. 
Further, Hamline was comparably situated with the other two private 
schools in Minnesota, all of which were located in the Minneapolis/St. Paul 
area.  Advertised tuition at all three schools was within $2,500 of each other.  
Moreover, for the two academic years before the closing of Hamline was 
announced, the three law schools were in the same U.S. News cohort, tightly 
bunched in the third quartile.  So far nothing suggests why Hamline was 
closed rather than its competitors William Mitchell or St. Thomas, or any 
number of other law schools in other cities.  More pertinently, Hamline 
seemed quite capable of competing successfully with William Mitchell and 
with St. Thomas. 
 
 
 394  See supra note 22 and accompanying text.   
 395  Hamline University, Hamline School of Law and William Mitchell College of Law to 
Combine (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.hamline.edu/news/2015/hamline-law-william-
mitchell-combine/; Adam Wahlberg, supra note 389.  
 396  Wahlberg, supra note 389.   
 397  Compare Hamline University School of Law 2011 Standard 509 Information Report, 
supra note 391 (noting 34 fall/35 spring) with Hamline University School of Law 2014 
Standard 509 Information Report, supra note 392 (noting 14 fall/18 spring).  See Ashby Jones 
& Jennifer Smith, Amid Falling Enrollment, Law Schools Are Cutting Faculty, WALL. ST. J., 
July 15, 2013, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323664204578607810
292433272 (noting early retirement offers) and Hamline University, Hamline University of 
Minnesota Financial Statements Years Ended June 30, 2014 and 2013, at 22 
https://www.hamline.edu/offices/finance/. Note that William Mitchell had also engaged in an 
aggressive downsizing of its faculty. William Mitchell College of Law 2011 Standard 509 
Information Report and William Mitchell College of Law 2015 Standard 509 Information 
Report, http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org/.   
 398  Hamline University, Fall Census Day Enrollment, 1997 to Present, 
https://www.hamline.edu/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=2147500001&li
bID=2147500134; Hamline University, Hamline University of Minnesota Financial 
Statements: Years Ended June 30, 2016 and 2015, at 5, 34, https://www.hamline.edu/
offices/finance/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).  
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Curiously, and perhaps tellingly, officials at Hamline and William 
Mitchell were completely silent about their motivations.  The joint press 
release extolls the virtues of a combined law school but says nothing about 
why Hamline wanted to divest itself of its law school, nor why William 
Mitchell was eager to absorb its cross-town rival.  My surmise is that the 
decision to close the law school came about from a combination of financial 
issues at the university level, a lack of mission fit between the law school 
and the university, a motivated acquiring law school, and a solution that 
seemed likely both to generate little ill will for Hamline and little dislocation 
for the law school’s faculty, staff, and students. 
Two years before the transaction, Hamline University showed an 
operating surplus of $2.8 million dollars.  The next year the surplus was only 
$995,000.  In the 2014-2015 year, in which the transaction was negotiated 
and announced, Hamline ran an operating deficit of $1.5 million, of which 
only 10% was attributable to the law school’s operations.  The university’s 
operating losses continued after the law school was disposed of, with the 
university running another $1.5 million operating deficit in 2015-2016.399  
This suggests that the university was motivated to dispose of the law school 
to help stanch its own operating deficits. 
In terms of mission, the law school was the only academic unit at 
Hamline that did not educate undergraduates.  Hamline’s median ACT score 
for entering undergrads was roughly in the 75th percentile; the law school’s 
median LSAT score was just above the 50th percentile.400  The university’s 
mission focused on distinctly more able students (by traditional measures) 
than the law school did.  It is entirely plausible, though I am aware of no 
public information, that the disconnect between the university’s mission and 
that of the law school played an important part in the university’s decision 
to discontinue the law school. 
 
 
 399  Hamline University, Hamline University of Minnesota Financial Statements Years 
Ended June 30, 2014 and 2013, at 4, 5 https://www.hamline.edu/offices/finance/.  Hamline 
University, Hamline University of Minnesota Financial Statements Years Ended June 30, 
2015 and 2014, at 4, https://www.hamline.edu/offices/finance/; Hamline University, Hamline 
University of Minnesota Financial Statements Years Ended June 30, 2016 and 2015, at 4, 5, 
34, https://www.hamline.edu/offices/finance/ (noting 2015-2016 deficit, 2014-2015 
university deficit without law school, and law school deficit).   
 400  Hamline University, Undergraduate Admission: High School Counselor’s Guide, 
https://www.hamline.edu/undergraduate/admission/highschool-counselors-guide.html (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2017); ACT, Inc., National Distributions of Cumulative Percents for ACT 
Test Scores: ACT-Tested High School Graduates from 2013, 2014, and 2015, 
https://www.act.org/content/dam/act/unsecured/documents/NormsChartMCandComposite-
Web2015-16.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2017); Hamline University School of Law 2015 
Standard 509 Information Report, supra note 392; LSAC, IRR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
DOCUMENT (2015).   
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Perhaps an added, possibly determinative, incentive for Hamline was 
William Mitchell’s motivation to acquire Hamline’s law school.  In many 
respects, William Mitchell’s position was similar to Hamline’s in that 
William Mitchell’s entering class declined 45% from 2011 to 2014, its 
median LSAT declined a few points, and its median financial aid grant 
stayed relatively constant.401  Like Hamline, William Mitchell had shed 
faculty, as well.402  But William Mitchell’s operating results were fluctuating 
wildly.  In the three academic years before the transaction, William Mitchell 
reported a surplus of $2.9 million, a deficit of $1.6 million, and a surplus of 
$1.3 million.403  But in the year in which the transaction was negotiated, 
Mitchell’s tuition revenue declined by $3 million dollars and its financial aid 
cost increased by $1 million.404  In the end, the school reported an operating 
deficit of $3.2 million.405  Perhaps William Mitchell’s administration 
believed that its finances were likely to erode further in the coming years.  If 
so, this belief may have spurred William Mitchell to offer Hamline terms 
generous enough that Hamline agreed to divest itself of its law school.406 
Finally, Hamline’s and William Mitchell’s reticence to be explicit 
about the reasons for the acquisition and to even acknowledge that Hamline 
was effectively closing, may have helped the transaction to take place.  
Hamline, and the law school, could simply elide over the fact that the law 
school was closing.  Since William Mitchell was located about three miles 
away from Hamline, there was essentially no dislocation involved for the 
remaining Hamline faculty, staff, or students.  It is possible that Hamline’s 
president was keenly aware of the attractiveness of structuring the 
acquisition as a combination with a near-by institution.  She had been a 
senior administrator at Seattle University when it acquired the University of 
Puget Sound School of Law, then located about 30 miles away.407 
 
 
 401  Whittier Law School 2011 Standard 509 Information Report; supra note 390; ABA, 
Whittier Law School 2014 Standard 509 Information Report; http://www.abarequired
disclosures.org/.   
 402  Leichter, supra note 41.   
 403  William Mitchell College of Law, IRS Form 990 (2013); William Mitchell College of 
Law, IRS Form 990 (2014).   
 404  Compare William Mitchell College of Law, IRS Form 990, at 9–10 (2014) with 
William Mitchell College of Law, IRS Form 990, at 9–10 (2015).   
 405  William Mitchell College of Law, IRS Form 990, at 1 (2015).  Note that the total 
deficit reported, $4.8 million, includes $1.6 million in expenses incurred in acquiring 
Hamline. Id. at 10.   
 406  Some of the arrangement between Hamline and William Mitchell is described in 
Hamline University of Minnesota Financial Statements: Years Ended June 30, 2016 and 
2015, supra note 398, at 27, 32-34.   
 407  Keith Ervin & Lee Moriwaki, Seattle U Acquires UPS Law School—News Of Deal 
Shocks And Angers Students On Tacoma Campus, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 9, 1993), 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19931109&slug=1730804.  
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At Whittier, the university had been considering significant changes in 
the law school since at least 2015 when the board appointed a subcommittee 
to explore “options for the future” of the law school.408  By January 2017, 
the university made known to the law school faculty that an agreement to 
transfer the law school was being negotiated.409  Those negotiations fell 
through and the university was unable to identify another entity that could 
plausibly buy or take the law school.  In mid-April 2017, the university 
announced that it would not admit new law students in the fall.410  The 
official announcement said the board had long been concerned by “the 
challenges affecting our law program” and had taken devoted resources to 
“improve student outcomes” and “achieve enhanced academic viability.”411  
A few weeks later, a spokesperson for Whittier said that the decision was 
based on “educational considerations” and not because of “financial 
exigency.”  The spokesperson also said that the university closed the law 
school because enrollment had declined and because of “students’ poor 
academic achievement,” which presumably means poor bar passage 
results.412 
In line with many schools, Whittier’s net tuition revenue had declined 
as a result of both fewer entering students and increased financial aid.413  But 
unlike some other schools, Whittier had been able to cut its costs and, at least 
through the 2014-2015 year, it ran an operating surplus.414  However, 
Whittier’s bar passage rates compared to those of other ABA accredited 
schools in California were abysmal.  Whitter placed dead last out of 21 ABA 
accredited California law schools, and far below the median, in the July bar 
 
 408  Whittier Law School, A Message from the Whittier College Board of Trustees, (Apr. 
19, 2017), https://www.law.whittier.edu/index/news/article/a-message-from-the-whittier-
college-board-of-trustees. 
 409  Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application for a TRO, Cohen v. Whittier College, 5-6 (Apr. 18, 
2017).   
 410  Whittier Law School, supra note 408.   
 411  Id.   
 412  Adolfo Guzman-Lopez, Questions linger over closure of Whittier Law School, (May 
3, 2017), http://www.scpr.org/news/2017/05/03/71427/questions-linger-over-closure-of-
whittier-law-scho/.  
 413  Whittier College, Audited Financial Statements For The Year Ended June 30, 2016, 
at-v,-https://www.whittier.edu/sites/default/files/media/businessoffice/WhittierCollege_
Issued_FS_6_30_16.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2017); Whittier College, Audited Financial 
Statements For The Year Ended June 30, 2015, at v, https://www.whittier.edu/sites/default/
files/media/businessoffice/FS%2014-15%20Final.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2017). 
 414  Audited Financial Statements For The Year Ended June 30, 2015, supra note 420, at 
vi; Rick Selzer, Whittier Law School shutdown raises prospect of future closures and access 
for underrepresented students, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.inside
highered.com/news/2017/04/25/whittier-law-school-shutdown-raises-prospect-future-
closures-and-access.   
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exams in 2014, 2015, and 2016.415 
While those results doubtless had an effect on the law school’s 
recruiting efforts and thus its finances, they are also inconsistent with the 
university’s image.  As with Hamline, Whittier is essentially focused on 
undergraduate education rather than graduate or professional education.  
More prosaically, the law school is located 30 miles away from the 
university, roughly an hour’s drive.  That physical separation doubtless 
impeded collaboration between law and university faculties and doubtless 
meant that the personal relationships between the faculties and staffs of the 
law school and university were weak.  The university’s president admitted 
that the physical separation of the law school from the university was a factor 
in the university’s decision to close the law school.416 
Finally, a conjecture on the role of the presidents of Hamline and of 
Whittier in the decision to close each law school.  As I noted above, a 
university’s board would rarely, if ever, close an academic unit over the 
objection of the president, and a president’s reputation would seldom be 
enhanced by shutting down a part of the university.417  This dynamic may 
help to explain why more law schools have not been closed.  But this 
dynamic might not have applied to either Hamline or Whittier.418  In both 
cases, the president intended to retire within a year of closing the law 
school.419  At such a career stage, it is possible that a president is less 
concerned about the effect on her reputation of cutting an academic program 
because she is not intending to leverage her current job into another one.  
Such a president might then feel more free to effect, and advocate to the 
board, changes in the university that otherwise might hamper the president 
in her career.  A retiring president might push for these changes in part 
because they seem best for the university and in part because she, or the 
board (or both), might believe that dealing with such a contentious decision 
before retiring would allow the new president to begin with greater political 
 
 415  Staci Zaretsky, California Bar Exam Results By Law School (2016), ABOVE THE LAW 
(Dec. 13, 2016), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/12/california-bar-exam-results-by-law-school-
2016/?rf=1; Joe Patrice, Who’s To Blame For School’s ‘Horrific’ Bar Results? Maybe The 
California Bar Examiners., ABOVE THE LAW Dec. 6, 2016, http://abovethelaw.com/
2016/12/whos-to-blame-for-schools-horrific-bar-results-maybe-the-california-bar-
examiners/?rf=1.   
 416  Selzer, supra note 414.   
 417  See supra note 240 and accompanying text.   
 418  I emphasize that my assertions here are strictly conjectural, as no public information 
supports or refutes them.   
 419  Joe Kimball, Hamline University President Linda Hanson to retire in 2015, MINNPOST 
(May 12, 2014), https://www.minnpost.com/political-agenda/2014/05/hamline-university-
president-linda-hanson-retire-2015; President Herzberger to Retire as President After 
Twelve-Year Tenure, (June 5, 2017), https://www.whittier.edu/news/mon-06052017-901-
am/president-herzberger-retire-president-after-twelve-year-tenure.   
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capital. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Most observers of the current legal education crisis seem to view law 
schools as sui generis; no other academic discipline’s experience can have 
relevance to the current legal education issues.  They also are generally 
negative in their outlook for law schools or focus on internal changes in legal 
education as the solution to the current problems.  In fact, though, the crisis 
in dental education has much congruence to the current crisis in legal 
education.  The lessons should be viewed as ones of optimism, not 
pessimism.  Most centrally, the lesson is that schools will not solve their 
problems by looking within themselves.  Rather, they, and especially their 
deans and faculties, must be intentional in their focus on mission and 
engagement.  The dean, in particular, has a heightened responsibility to 
ensure that the school is engaged with the university and other external 
constituencies.  In all of this, law school faculties and deans must understand 
the importance of prestige and rankings.  The lack of prestige measure and 
rankings was an important drawback to dental schools. 
